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ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of this thesis will be on three main components, namely, monetary transmission 
mechanisms, financial innovation and portfolio hedging. It will first discuss the different 
channels of monetary policy and how they affect economic and financial variables. Then, 
financial innovation will be analyzed from the perspective of Hyman P. Minsky and the effects 
on the financial system. Next, the relation of regulation to the changing financial landscape of 
the economy will be discussed. Finally, the use of financial derivatives will be reviewed, 
presenting their hedging function and speculative risks. Then, the impact of too big to fail banks 
and their inability to effectively hedge systemic risk will be discussed. A peculiar example, 
known as the JPMorgan London Whale Scandal, will illustrate the influence of too big to fail 
banks on their hedging activities and the repercussions for policy and future reform. Then, the 
difficulties these banks face in performing a macro hedge will be examined. Ultimately, 
financial innovation and too big to fail banks impede the influence of monetary policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Due to the profit seeking nature of too big to fail banks and financial innovation it 
impedes the affects of monetary policy. One example that illustrates this view is the JPMorgan 
London Whale Scandal. Essentially, this scandal was a result of the banks efforts to profit from 
a hedge of credit risk. However, in order to run an effective hedge the bank would have to 
sustain losses. Ultimately, this was unattractive to the bank and they proceeded to run a hedge 
that was profitable, up until a certain point. For banks that are considered to be too big to fail, it 
is nearly impossible for them to run a macro hedge. This is so because the banks are too large 
and too complex. Essentially, they would have to take up a huge portion of the markets share 
and have multiple counterparties in order to hedge systemic risk. Thus, as JPMorgan proceeded 
with attempting this impossible hedge, the management team was unaware of what was going 
on, and the balance sheet had become so large that they could not set up an effective hedge. 
Therefore, the market began to price against their position and the hedge became too costly, 
resulting in substantial losses. We can consider this example a type of financial innovation 
because JPMorgan was having difficulty controlling their balance sheet due to systemic risk and 
the size and nature of the hedging strategy.   
 However, with financial innovation the impact of policy and regulation used to limit the 
nature of too big to fail banks is weakened. Ultimately, due to the fact that unique and 
sophisticated financial instruments are used to hedge against their future downside risk such as, 
a credit stress event. Thus, as the economy developed into a complex capitalist system, 
innovators found ways to constantly evade regulation that was intended to control the 
construction of financial portfolios. However, throughout history, in examples such as, The 
Credit Crunch of 1966 and The Liquidity Squeeze of 1970, authorities are unable to completely 
control the business practices that triggered instability. In both cases, a financial instrument 
disturbed the structure of the economy and resulted in intervention by the Federal Reserve to 
help combat the fragility that was created. However, when “the Federal Reserve protects a 
financial instrument, it legitimizes the use of [that] instrument to finance activity” (Minsky 
1986a). Ultimately, innovation is a result of the profit seeking nature of the bank, which 
transitioned the economic system to one where “financial crisis was unlikely into one that was 
vulnerable to crises” (Minsky 1986a). Economic structure continually adapts to financial 
innovation and contains the instability in the system. Minsky characterized the financial system 
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as one with periods of tranquility. During tranquil periods, financial innovation and more risky 
practices are undertaken pushing the system to greater instability even though profits are rising 
at the same time (Minsky 1986a). Essentially, “stability is destabilizing.” Authorities’ attempt to 
constrain recessions gives entrepreneurs the belief that their own profits will continue to 
increase. This is mainly caused by the lender of last resort intervention as well as a large 
government deficit, however, the apparent success leads to changes in the ratio of payment 
commitments on debt accounts to income flows, ultimately making policy interventions less 
effective when they are utilized (Minsky 1986b). Next, we can consider the role of monetary 
policy in the economy and look at how it attempts to influences these banks that are considered 
to be too big to fail. However, what we will discover is that the nature of these banks impedes 
the impact of monetary policy through the use of financial innovation. 
  Monetary transition mechanisms refer to the way in which monetary policy affects asset 
prices and general economic conditions such as GDP, employment and inflation. There are 
several monetary transmission mechanisms such as the interest rate channel, the credit channel 
and the exchange rate channel. The goal of monetary policy is to maximize employment while 
maintaining low and stable inflation. In turn the chosen policy will either spur or restrain growth 
for overall demand for goods and services. There are two main impacts of monetary policy. 
First, the Minsky impact shows that a change in interest rates will influence bank portfolios, 
which in turn impacts bank leading. Economist such as Frederic S. Mishkin believe, with 
contractionary monetary policy, interest rates will increase which in turn increases the cost of 
capital causing a decline in investment spending reducing aggregate demand and leading to a 
fall in output (Mishkin 1996). The transmission mechanisms of monetary policy represent the 
effects of monetary policy on the real economy. A Neoclassical approach, proposed by John B. 
Taylor shows that, “contractionary monetary policy raises the short-term nominal interest rate. 
Then, through a combination of sticky prices and rational expectations, the real long-term 
interest rate rises as well, at least for a time” (Taylor 1995). High interest rates then are expected 
to reduce investment and expenditure, which produces a decline in aggregate output. The second 
view is the traditional view, which states that a change in interest rates impacts investment 
through the multiplier effect of investment. In the case of expansionary monetary policy, a 
reduction in the Federal Funds rate leads to a decrease in the cost of borrowing for commercial 
banks at the Central Bank. The overnight rate, the rate at which banks lend to each other, would 
then start to decrease generating an expansion in the lending amongst banks. This generates 
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excess liquidity in the system, which is then used to provide more credit to the financial sector. 
The increased demand in the securities market puts upward pressure on the prices and requires a 
further reduction in nominal interest rates, which in turn reduces the real interest rate in a 
downward manner, holding inflation expectations unchanged (bankpedia 2009). As a result of 
expansionary monetary policy, an expansion of investment and consumption. As the price of 
financial assets rises, the value of assets held by households and firms increases in relation to 
the cost of capital, what is commonly referred to as Tobin’s Q (bankpedia 2009). Due to the fact 
that the stock of wealth of households has increased this should increase private consumption, as 
well as increase investment by firms. This impact translates to the credit channel because in a 
monetary expansion, conducted by the Central Bank, commercial banks are made more liquid, 
increasing their reserves (bankpedia 2009). This is important in determining the supply of credit 
to the private sector. By affecting the expectations of market participants the Central Bank 
creates expectations on future prices and rates, which ultimately influences the yield curve. The 
more expectations can be influenced the better the authorities are able to create stability in the 
future, thus keeping the yield curve at its normal shape. Monetary policy is a critical component 
in helping control the interaction between lenders and borrowers. Banks that are considered to 
be too big to fail have found ways to innovate around the affects of monetary policy. Through 
financial innovation, too big to fail banks create instability within the financial system. 
Therefore, it is critical to first understand how monetary policy works. 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: MONETARY TRANSMISISON MECHANISMS (ORTHODOX VS. 
HETERODOX) 
 
Orthodox:  
 Monetary authorities use monetary policy to influence real variables such as GDP and 
inflation. There are many rates that can be used to transmit policy objectives to the real market 
such as exchange rates, long-term interest rates and short-term interest rate. Current policy is to 
influence the short-term interest rate. The Federal Funds rate is typically targeted because it is 
closely correlated to many of the other mentioned rates and it is the main rate used by monetary 
authorities in conducting policy. It is important to compare the mainstream approach with the 
Minsky view to see where the two differ.  
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Interest Rate Channel: 
 Essentially, the mainstream approach does not take into account the effects on bank 
portfolios and the various financial instruments that can be used to hedge against their interest 
rate risk. Monetary authorities attempt to affect real interest rates through changes in nominal 
rates. The relationship between real and nominal interest rates depends on the following two 
assumptions, “rational expectations and rigidities of wages and goods prices. An increase in the 
nominal interest rate will bring about an increase in the real interest rate if the rationally 
expected inflation rate does not increase by the same amount” (Taylor 1995). It is important to 
note that this adjustment does not happen instantaneously. The price of goods and services 
adjusts slowly due to the affect of rational expectations; increasing the nominal interest rate 
changes the real interest rate over the time period that it takes for prices and expectations to 
adjust (Taylor 1995). Due to this lag, in the long run the real interest rate will converge back to 
its point of equilibrium. Essentially, wages, the price of goods and services and real GDP adjust 
to their original equilibrium. 
 Many textbooks note that interest rates are affected by the actions of the Central Bank to 
change the supply of money in the economy. However this view is flawed and outdated for two 
main reasons: “first the money demand equations appear to be too unstable to yield a reliable 
estimated effect of a given change in the money supply. Second, Central Bank behavior is not 
accurately described by one time changes in the money supply” (Taylor 1995). It is necessary 
for the Federal Reserve to have a reaction function rather than relying on a fixed money supply. 
In order to achieve necessary movements in the Federal Funds rate more is necessary. Long-
term interest rates are important when it comes to consumption and investment demand due to 
the fact that many of the decisions to invest in the future are based on the long-term rate. 
Therefore, the long-term interest rate depends on how monetary policy is conducted and 
transmitted. There is a key relationship between short-term and a long-term interest rates 
referred to as the expectations mode of the term structure. Essentially, the long-term rate is 
given by the expected weighted average of future short-term rates appropriate for the maturity 
of a long-term bond (Taylor 1995). For example, if the Central Bank is raising the short-term 
rate but market participants have the expectation that the short-term rate will return to its normal 
level in the future, then the long-term rate will increase less than the short-term rate. On the 
opposite side, if expectations are that the short-term rate will continually be increased in the 
future then the long-term rates will rise at a higher volume than the short-term rate. Further, 
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consider an increase in the real short-term interest rate and its affect on the long-term rate. This 
would raise the price of goods and services purchased in the current day resulting in a decrease 
in demand. Here, consumption and investment are negatively correlated with the real interest 
rate. Currently, we see the Federal Reserve utilizing their strategy of the dot plot, which follows 
a similar pattern to the previous examples regarding market participants’ expectations.  
 Mishkin points out in the basic Keynesian IS-LM framework its main objective is the 
emphasis on the real interest rate rather than the nominal rate, which affects consumer and 
business decisions. The real long-term interest rate is viewed as having a major impact on 
spending, not the short-term interest rate (Mishkin 1996). The change in the short-term nominal 
interest rate by the Central Bank can affect the real interest rate on short-term and long-term 
bonds because of the assumption of sticky prices. Therefore, expansionary policy lowers the 
short-term nominal rate and also the real short-term interest rate. Furthermore, because the long-
term interest rate is an average of the expected future short-term interest rates this would entail 
that the lower real short-term rate leads to a fall in the real long-term rate (Mishkin 1996). Due 
to the fact that real interest rates are the main concern, it is possible to have a case of a zero 
interest rate floor. However, during a deflationary episode monetary policy can still influence 
the economy. This is so because when nominal interest rates are zero an expansion in the money 
supply raises the expected price level and, therefore, expected inflation, lowering the real 
interest rate even when the nominal rate is at zero (Mishkin 1996). This results in a stimulation 
of spending through the interest rate channel.  
 However, the Keynesian IS-LM framework only focuses on the interest rate rather than 
other asset prices. Looking through a monetarist lens, when the money supply of the economy is 
increasing firms and consumers will try and reduce their holdings through an increase in 
spending (Mishkin 1996). From a Keynesian perspective a fall in the interest rate makes bonds 
become less attractive compared to equities, thereby, causing price of equities to rise. If we 
consider Tobin’s Q, higher equity prices will increase Tobin’s Q which is the market value of 
the firm divided by the replacement cost of capital, thus, resulting in higher investment spending 
(Mishkin 1996). Also, the increase in stock prices results in a wealth effect because the financial 
wealth of consumers increases, so the consumption of consumers should increase as well.  
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Credit Channel: 
 The credit channel of monetary transmission attempts to take asymmetric information 
into account, via the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel. Banks play an 
important role in solving asymmetric information in credit markets. Mishkin points out that as 
long as there is no perfect substitutability for retail bank funds with other sources of funds then 
the bank-lending channel of monetary policy works (Mishkin 1996). As we will see, this is not 
always the case. The story Mishkin presents goes as follows, banks play a special role in the 
sense that borrowers will not have access to the credit market unless they borrow from them. 
The main argument is that expansionary monetary policy increases bank reserves and bank 
deposits. Hence, this increases the quantity of bank loans available. This is a Neoclassical view 
on the operations of how banks operate, which is flawed. Essentially, it following Say’s law, 
when in reality deposits do not create loans, loans create deposits. The story then goes on to say 
that with the increase in loans banks will cause investment and consumption to rise. A few 
disputes arise from the idea that access to credit is not limited solely to banks. Traditional bank 
lending has recently declined and banks have been playing a less important role in credit 
markets. Also, regulatory restrictions requiring reserves to be held on certain financial 
instruments have been abolished, so it is easier for banks to make up for reserve losses if need 
be. The decline in the number of banks, and their sources of funds to make loans, reduces the 
capability to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets, causing a 
reduction in investment and a decline in economic activity (Mishkin 1996). 
 
Balance Sheet Channel:  
 The balance sheet channel, also deals with the issue of asymmetric information in credit 
markets. Essentially, the lower the net worth of business firms, the more severe the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems are in lending to these firms (Mishkin 1996). A low net 
worth means that the borrower has less collateral to pledge signaling that they are unable to 
meet their obligations and vice versa, the lender has less collateral for their loans. This increases 
the adverse selection problem leading to a decrease in lending. Essentially, moral hazard 
increases because the owners have less equity in their firms, which may cause them to engage in 
risky practices or investment projects, leading to a decrease in lending and investment spending 
because it is more likely that the lenders will not be paid back. 
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 As we noted above, in an expansionary monetary policy environment, equity prices rise 
leading to higher investment spending and aggregate demand because this in turn reduces 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Mishkin 1996). Expansionary monetary policy 
also improves the firm’s balance sheet by raising the firm’s cash flow in nominal terms, which 
again reduces adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Here, the focus is on nominal 
interest rates instead of real interest rates because interest rates on short-term debt typically have 
a greater impact than long-term debt payments on a firm’s cash flow; therefore the nominal rates 
affect the firm’s cash flow more (Mishkin 1996). Similarly, in regards to adverse selection, 
expansionary monetary policy stimulating aggregate output involves credit rationing. Credit 
rationing results when borrowers are denied loans even when they are willing to pay a higher 
interest rate (Mishkin 1996). Mainly, those willing to pay a higher interest rate are ones with the 
most risky investment ideas. Mishkin says that higher interest rates increase the adverse 
selection problem while lower interest rates reduce it. He says that when interest rates are low, 
less risky borrowers will flood the market and more lenders will be willing to lend, increasing 
both investment and output. Next, we look at the price level effect of the balance sheet channel. 
Essentially, debts are contracted in nominal terms so when there is an unanticipated increase in 
the price level the value of the firm’s liabilities in real terms decreases (Mishkin 1996). The 
unanticipated rise in the price level, therefore, raises real net worth which lowers the adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, increasing investment spending and aggregate output.  
 
Heterodox:  
 Minsky's view is more concerned with money managers and financial structures also 
known as, Money Manager Capitalism. Minsky was helpful in pointing out the fact that 
“financial conditions affect expenditure” (Fazzari 1999). Although, some of Minsky’s work has 
been introduced into the mainstream approach there still remains differences between the two 
theories, especially, in dealing with the role financial institutions play in macroeconomic 
fluctuations. When Minsky was writing finance entered into economic models through the 
money demand function that provided the foundation for the LM curve in the IS-LM framework 
(Fazzari 1999). Financial variables were viewed as irrelevant in determining real economic 
variables and Minsky’s work received little attention. Minsky noticed the “importance of 
financial factors for investment” prior to the middle of the 1990s when mainstream 
Neoclassicists began incorporating this into their theory (Fazzari 1999). Minsky and the 
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mainstream approach share the common belief that firms make investment projects to maximize 
the present value of expected cash flows that result from investment (Fazzari 1999). Minsky 
believed that a firm’s financial structure was the most important part in determining investment 
whereas the mainstream approach believes that investment is independent from the access to 
finance or the cost of financing. The availability and cost of external financing depends on the 
firm’s liability structure, which can be viewed as the history of payments that appear on a firm’s 
balance sheet that result from past investment activity (Fazzari 1999). For Minsky, the cost of 
debt “exceeds the opportunity cost of internal cash flows by [an] amount that depends on the 
strength of the firms balance sheet and the prevailing conditions in the credit markets” (Fazzari 
1999). Essentially, Minsky says that debt can exceed the amount of cash on balance sheets 
depending on the firm’s ability to pay. Thus, they will be able to take on more debt as long as 
commitments are met.  
 Today, economic theories are created concerning an abstract non-financial economy 
when in reality we are living in an economy with complex financial institutions (Fazzari 1999). 
In financial markets asymmetric information presents a risk that lenders need to hedge against. 
However, if the lender is considered a bank that is too big to fail how will it run a macro hedge 
against their entire risk exposure? In the concept of asymmetric information the seeker knows 
more about the quality of the good than the buyer (Fazzari 1999). In credit markets firms know 
more about the quality of their credit than the lenders. Due to this, lenders will always be 
skeptical of who they are issuing loans to. Even if the borrower is a creditworthy borrower the 
lenders will charge a premium because there is a chance that the borrower is a risky debtor. 
Hence, those with sound investment projects may not be able to find the funds necessary to 
begin because they are being charged a premium rate, making the project undesirable. 
Therefore, the borrowers who are left when credit is being rationed will be the risky borrowers, 
and they will accept the premium rates because they are aware of the risk associated with their 
endeavors, but also, they will bear the reward.  
 Fazzari argues that, “asymmetric information is a fundamental characteristic of a 
decentralized economy, because decentralization inevitably leads to information differences” 
(Fazzari 1999). Therefore, asymmetric information is a necessary condition in modern 
economies for the presence of financing constraints on investment. Due to the cost of external 
financing in dealing with the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, firms will prefer 
to finance from their internal cash flows because it has a lower cost than external finance. 
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Minsky also notes the importance of leverage and its ability to finance through a strong balance 
sheet. Depending on a firm’s balance sheet condition, it will be able to acquire financing at a 
lower cost or higher cost depending on how indebted the firm is. This is so because, “a decision 
to take on debt now, raises future leverage and, other things equal, limits the firms ability to 
finance future projects with new debt” (Fazzari 1999). Ultimately, the firm’s access to external 
credit is determined by the strength of the firm’s balance sheet. For Minsky, leverage and 
balance sheet affects are mainly a result of uncertainty and the level of indebtedness a firm has, 
thus, increasing risk. The act of operating on the liability side of the balance sheet generates a 
greater potential for risk.  
 Much of mainstream theory seeks to describe how monetary policy affects the aggregate 
economy. However, mainstream models regarding market imperfections such as asymmetric 
information are not relevant to Minsky’s work. The models that incorporate these imperfections 
from asymmetric information in real business cycle models are not intellectually common with 
Minsky’s work. They affect investment through supply side forces. Minsky has a similar theory 
regarding the balance sheet channel in the sense that, mainstream research notices that firms 
must pay premiums for external funds depending on the state of their balance sheet, or its 
internal net worth, while highly leveraged firms will have to pay more for debt than a firm with 
little debt (Fazzari 1999). Minsky noticed that the cost and availability of debt depends on a 
firm’s balance sheet. Minsky and the mainstream approach differ in the notion of where shocks 
to the financial system ultimately come from. Minsky believed that shocks are endogenous to 
the system. He believed that “instability is determined by mechanisms within the system, not 
outside it; our economy is not unstable because it is shocked by oil, wars or monetary surprises 
but because of its nature” (Fazzari 1999). The mainstream approach believes that shocks to the 
financial system are exogenous and that financial factors do not play a role in determining the 
source of the fluctuations. In Minsky’s view investment today raises profits to generate cash 
flows, which are needed for future investment. This generates more cash flows but the system 
has its limits as the economy reaches its capacity. This is so because higher leverage ratios 
require margins of safety to be stretched making the economy more susceptible to shocks 
(Fazzari 1999). Essentially, this provides a ceiling to the expansion of the economy and 
ultimately results in a downturn of the economy.  
 Minsky’s work has helped point out to the mainstream economist that there exists a link 
between financial instability and macroeconomic policy. Financial structure and the behavior of 
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financial institutions influence the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Monetary 
policy relies on “small interest elasticities of investment and consumption” (Fazzari 1999). 
Minsky understands that there is a need for monetary policy and the lender of last resort 
function in the economy but the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy do not fully solve 
the inherent instability found in the capitalist system. Minsky noted the importance of the lender 
of last resort function but he was also not naive of its failures. Essentially, this function allows 
large banks to be bailed out in times of difficulty making the moral hazard problem more severe 
as Central Banks validate risky practices (Fazzari 1999). The mainstream response is that it is an 
issue of intervention. Minsky agreed that the bailouts can make the system more fragile and lead 
to future instability but it is a better alternative than resulting to a debt deflation and causing a 
depression to happen again.  
 The impact of monetary policy to the real economy can be seen through a firm’s user 
cost elasticity. This means, “the price sensitivity of business investment spending is a central 
element in economic analysis” (Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer 1996). The user cost elasticity 
helps determine how effective monetary policy is at transmitting its effects to the real economy. 
If the user cost elasticity is high, monetary policy can have a significant impact on business 
investment spending. On the other hand, a low user cost elasticity results in minimal effects 
from monetary policy. The user cost combines interest, tax and depreciation rates with relative 
prices. So, by way of the Neoclassical framework of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy, the user cost is affected by monetary authorities altering the level of bank reserves in the 
banking system, which in turn affects short-term interest rates and, thus, long-term interest rates 
(Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer 1996). It can be argued that firms response to monetary policy 
reduce financial innovation. Hence, I would argue that there exist a low user cost elasticity due 
to the weak nature of monetary policy and the motivation of firms to innovate around the 
barriers presented by authorities. Much of the economic research established presents the user 
cost elasticity as significant. However, Bernanke and Gertler (1995 Pg. 27) rationalize that 
“interest-sensitive components of aggregate spending have in fact had great difficulty in 
identifying a quantitatively important effect of the neoclassical cost-of-capital variable” 
(Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer 1996).  
 Furthermore, the paper titled, What Do Micro Data Revel About The User Cost 
Elasticity, estimates that the user cost elasticity is much lower than what it is often assumed to 
be. They find that it is around -0.25 with a standard error of 0.03 to 0.06. In many models they 
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assume the user cost of elasticity to be unity. However, the paper concludes that the user cost 
elasticity is much lower than what is assumed. Therefore, “models that rely heavily on prices to 
allocate capital, as seen in the real business cycle tradition, may be misspecified” (Chirinko, 
Fazzari, and Meyer 1996). The important conclusion to draw is that interest rates only have a 
modest effect on investment, which in fact weakens the traditional monetary transmission 
mechanism. 
 
Orthodox Limitations: 
 Much of what we have seen is that the economy relies on low interest rates in order to 
affect the economy. Neoclassical theory relies on the assumptions that firms can sell what they 
want at their desired prices and financing for investment can be obtained for any project that is 
profitable (Fazzari 1993). Fazzari concludes that these Neoclassical models fail to look at the 
difference between sales or output growth from the cost of capital when determining investment 
decisions. Therefore, policy loses its effectiveness. Fazzari notes that interest rates have a small 
effect on investment because firms are more concerned with cash flow. Therefore, the belief that 
“higher interest rates will increase firms’ cost of capital and therefore crowd out private 
investment is, for many economists and policymakers, the primary reason for cutting the federal 
budget deficit” (Fazzari 1993). Essentially, Fazzari concludes from his paper titled, The 
Investment Finance Link, “interest rates and the cost of capital play a small and uncertain role in 
the determination of investment when compared with the strength of firms’ financial condition 
and the growth of their sales” (Fazzari 1993). For fast growing firms they are more concerned 
with economic growth, rather than, the effects of higher interest rates or capital costs. A deficit 
reduction would reduce economic growth and severely hurt rapidly growing firms. On the other 
hand, lower interest rates do not improve the level of investment related to the effects of 
economic growth.  
 Fazzari notes that investment is more responsive to the effects of taxation and spending 
initiatives to reduce the deficit of the overall economy than taxing or raising interest rates on the 
cost of capital. Policy to stimulate investment would need to be designed to directly put cash in 
the hands of investors. The dominant or Neoclassical view of investment is commonly used in 
deciding the impact of on economy. It states that there is a strong link between investment and 
the interest rates as well as taxation. Investment is affected by the market prices at which a firm 
sells it output that are not determined by anything else in a completely competitive market and 
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technology which decides the amount of output a firm will produce with its capital inputs 
(Fazzari 1993). Therefore, policy relies on impacting investment through relative prices. The 
models presented by Neoclassical theory are flawed because they assume that firms operate in 
completely competitive markets so that firms can purchase all their inputs and sell all the output 
at specified prices. Also, resources can be obtained if they do not have the funds necessary to 
pursue an investment project. They do this by issuing shares at fair market prices or by 
borrowing at prevailing interest rates. As we can see, in reality these assumptions do not hold 
because firms and large financial institutions use innovative techniques to innovate around these 
regulations and hedge their portfolio exposure against negative price adjustments in the markets. 
It is unrealistic to believe that the “only limitations firms perceive on their production arise from 
their technology and market prices” (Fazzari 1993). Fazzari notes that typically firms have some 
type of control over the price they charge and the sales they make are determined by the strength 
of demand for their products (Fazzari 1993). Therefore, future sales have an important impact 
on investment spending. This is known as the accelerator effect. If sales are high in the present 
and past then this will likely lead to the expectation of higher sales in the future and encourage 
investment spending. On the other hand, if sales are lower, then the firms will reduce 
investment. The accelerator affect is not necessarily a short-term phenomenon. It is assumed 
that the affects on investment are temporary because the economy will eventually converge to 
full employment equilibrium due to its natural adjustment mechanism (Fazzari 1993). 
Furthermore, the past performance of the economy does not dictate how the economy will 
perform in the future. Today, everyone is concerned with the deficit, however, there is little 
research that shows deficit spending hurts investment through the cost of capital channel due to 
government borrowing increasing interest rates and crowding out private investment (Fazzari 
1993). Fazzari notes that deficit spending can stimulate the economy and lead to more 
investment through the accelerator effect, which has been shown in research.  
 Fazzari notes that we cannot rely on the natural stabilizing forces of the economy. The 
Neoclassical theory also relies on the assumption that financing can be obtained for any 
investment that is seen as profitable at a cost based on market interest rates. However, there 
exist financial constraints that limit investment besides the interest rate, taxation and 
technology. If a firm cannot internally fund an investment project they will have to seek external 
finance. However, there are financial costs associated with external financing because financial 
intermediaries have to make the deals and also cover their own costs, making a profit. These 
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costs can be expensive and the firm may not end up undertaking the project, or postpone it. 
Also, when credit is rationed interest rates do not equate supply and demand for loans, which 
can leave firms without finance and constraints to their investments (Fazzari 1993). However, 
firms have become innovative and found new ways to increase financing for investment 
spending. More so, they can reduce assets held to raise funds without having to issue stock or 
borrow at costly rates. This all depends on the firm’s liquidity and its ability to generate cash 
flows even in times of a recession. If firms hold less liquid assets they will be affected the most 
in a downturn and become heavily indebted. As we can see, firms rely more on the strength of 
the economy and markets in dealing with their investment decisions. Interest rates do not have 
that large of an effect but a strong aggregate economy will improve the firm’s ability to finance 
capital spending (Fazzari 1993). The effect is small because the sensitivity of investment to 
interest rates is small. Lower spending by the government decreases sales growth and the firm’s 
cash flow. Also, more savings does not increase investment. This is an unreliable assumption 
because policy designed to increase savings could reduce investment in times of economic 
hardship. Thus, a deficit reduction is not the way to stimulate the economy. This is so because 
there would be weaker economic conditions and, therefore, less consumption leading and lower 
sales and profits.  
 The Central Bank can influence the monetary base, which is made up of currency and 
bank reserves. Monetary policy starts by first affecting these components by way of open 
market operations either by buying securities to increase the monetary base or selling securities 
to decrease the monetary base. Monetary policy affects the Central Banks balance sheet but the 
alteration to other financial institutions balance sheets may be minimal. Monetary policy works 
if the other financial agents in the game cannot offset the changing composition and quantity of 
their own liabilities. Therefore, “monetary transmission mechanisms must assume that there 
exist no privately issued securities that substitute perfectly for the components of the monetary 
base” (Ireland 2005). This can be an issue because through financial innovation, private 
institutions can issue liabilities that act as substitutes to the monetary base, having the 
characteristics of currency and or bank reserves. Therefore, if policy were conducted to move 
the nominal monetary base, then in order for the effects to move the economy, the nominal 
prices must not respond immediately to policy, otherwise the monetary base would remain 
unchanged (Ireland 2005). Hence, it must be assumed with models dealing with monetary 
transmission mechanism that some friction must be present so the nominal prices do not adjust 
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immediately and proportionately to the monetary base (Ireland 2005). Essentially, as nominal 
interest rates rise, other liquid assets become more attractive as short-term stores of value 
(Ireland 2005). Firms and banks decide to save their liquid holdings as they become more 
attractive in a rising rates environment. Therefore, when the price level does not fully adjust in 
the short run the Central Bank uses its monopolistic control over the nominal quantity of base 
money to influence short-term nominal interest rates. Thus, by increasing the monetary base 
through lending until there is a decline in the interest rate that is significant enough to encourage 
private agents to hold additional volumes of real base money (Ireland 2005).  
 There is close relationship between the interest rate and the monetary base in dealing 
with the effects of monetary policy. The authorities conduct policy today by setting a target rate 
for the short term nominal interest rate rather than setting the nominal supply of base money and 
letting the markets determine the Federal Funds rate. Thus, utilizing the Keynesian interest rate 
channel, “an increase in the short-term nominal interest rate first leads to an increase in longer 
term nominal interest rates, as investors act to arbitrage away differences in risk adjusted 
expected returns on debt instruments of different maturities, as described by the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure” (Ireland 2005). This affect will cause real interest rates to 
adjust as well so the cost of borrowing will increase and firms will reduce their investment 
expenditure and households will also reduce their consumption. This framework is central to the 
Keynesian IS-LM model but has many flaws. Monetarist would argue that the short-term 
nominal interest rate does not exhaust the effects of monetary policy completely. Monetarists 
believe that “monetary policy actions impact prices simultaneously across a wide variety of 
markets for financial assets and durable goods” (Ireland 2005). In the bank-lending channel of 
monetary policy, banks play a special role in the sense that they do not just issue liabilities but 
they also hold assets, such as bank loans, where few alternatives exist (Ireland 2005). In 
particular, small banks use deposits as the principle source of funds for lending to small firms 
and theses firms use bank loans as the primary source of funds for investment. Therefore, 
contractionary open market operations will cause a contraction of the supply of reserves and a 
reduction in bank deposits which will cause banks who are reliant on their deposits to cut back 
on their lending and firms who are dependent on bank loans will have to cut back on their 
investment spending (Ireland 2005). Looking through the credit channel and the balance sheet 
channel it is important to note that a firm’s cost of credit rises or falls with the strength of the 
firm’s balance sheet. Therefore, an increase in the interest rate can directly affect a firm’s 
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floating debt resulting in higher payments. Also, an interest rate increase can affect the value of 
firm’s long-term capital assets. Therefore, the interest rate channel can work with a lag, which 
ultimately raises the cost of capital through the balance sheet channel. 
 I would argue that the affects of the lending channel are only significant to community 
banks and not those who are considered to be too big to fail. The monetary authorities should 
not be worried about the actions of community banks because they are the ones who are 
stimulating small firms and community businesses to fuel local economies. In order to reach 
banks that are considered too big to fail they will need to look at the recent financial innovation 
that has been taking place and determine how banks are using these instruments to hedge against 
the affects of monetary policy.  
 Mishkin notes that asset prices are significant in determining monetary policy and its 
transmission to the economy. However, not all asset prices should be targeted because it can 
lead to even worse economic conditions. In order for monetary policy to improve economic 
performance, the nature of the shock must be dealt with. A collapse in asset prices would 
damage the economy but targeting asset prices should not be the way to control bubbles in the 
economy. In reality, monetary authorities are unable to identify bubbles. For this to happen, the 
monetary authorities would have to have perfect information about the health of the economy. 
Essentially, “if the Central Bank has no informational advantage, then if it knows that a bubble 
has developed that will eventually crash, then the market knows this too and then the bubble 
would unravel and thus would be unlikely to develop” (Mishkin 2001). Therefore, “without an 
informational advantage, the Central Bank is as likely to mispredict the presence of a bubble as 
the private market and thus will frequently be mistaken, thus frequently pursuing the wrong 
monetary policy” (Mishkin 2001). 
 
Monetary Transition Mechanisms and Financial Innovation: 
 Financial innovation breeds opportunity for profit seeking banks. It influences the 
structure of the market, the financial behavior of economic agents and types of financial 
products being traded. This adds uncertainty to the effectiveness of conducting monetary policy. 
This uncertainty can generate instability from innovative sources such as off balance sheet 
activities and the use of derivatives. Minsky notes that, the “innovative characteristics of 
banking and finance invalidates the fundamental presupposition of the Orthodox Quantity 
Theory of Money to the effect that there is an unchanging “money” item whose velocity of 
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circulation is sufficiently close to being constant: hence, changes in the money’s supply have a 
linear proportional relation to a well defined price level” (Minsky 1992). He also noticed that 
when financing constraints present themselves firms would innovate. One-way firms are able to 
continually increase and secure the amount of debt they can take on is through financial 
innovation. However, as innovation occurs and the economy heats up the policy tools put in 
place by monetary authorities start to have a minimal impact on controlling the profit seeking 
nature of these firms. 
 Additionally, in the paper titled, Inside the Black Box, points out the connection between 
financial innovation and its impact on the channels of monetary policy in terms of balance sheet 
operations and profit opportunities. Here, it is noted that the bank-lending channel has been 
difficult to research because of the changes that have occurred due to financial innovation. Thus, 
the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel of the credit view has been reduced. Monetary 
policy affects “the external finance premium by shifting the supply of intermediated credit, 
particularly loans by commercial banks” (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). Otherwise, known as the 
bank-lending channel. Banks seek to provide credit and “specialize in overcoming informational 
problems and other frictions in credit markets” (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). As we can see, 
banks have a critical role in providing credit to borrowers therefore any disruption in the supply 
of bank loans can shut off borrowers from credit. However, in dealing with the bank-lending 
channel, “can monetary policy affect the supply (or relative pricing) of bank loans” (Bernanke 
and Gertler 1995)? Banks have deepened the markets and are able to raise funds through 
innovative means. Mishkin notes in his paper that, “the demand for banks’ managed liabilities is 
not perfectly elastic” (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). His model found that “during tight-money 
periods, when open market interest rates rise, the prime rate rises by even more and credit terms 
become more onerous” (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). This correlation was found in a time 
period where monetary policy was restrictive. Therefore, the affects of financial innovation may 
not have been fully accounted for because as the economy evolved more financial techniques 
have been created to hedge against interest rate risk and the impact of reserve requirements. 
Mishkin reaffirms in his paper “the behavior of interest rate spreads and terms of lending are 
consistent with the bank lending channel” (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). However, both 
“financial deregulation and innovation have diminished the importance of the traditional bank 
lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). The balance sheet channel seems to have a more 
important impact because when interest rates rise this will lower the value of bank securities and 
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impair the banks capital making it harder for them to attract funds and hurt their ability to make 
loans (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). We will see how the profit motives of banks influence them 
to behave in risky ways and undertake speculative positions. Lastly, Mishkin notes that “in the 
United States, increased bank holdings of volatile securities and derivatives instruments may 
have increased the sensitivity of bank lending to interest rates via the balance sheet channel” 
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995). 
 We have previously seen, that monetary policy affects smaller institutions more than 
larger institutions. When monetary policy is conducted, the “agency costs of lending 
endogenously change with monetary policy” (Black and Rosen 2007). When there is a 
contractionary monetary policy action it will reduce the net worth of borrowers, which in turn 
increases the costs for borrowers, increasing the agency costs (Black and Rosen 2007). 
However, this is mainly a circumstance amongst the smaller firms and institutions because 
lenders look to invest in less risky firms and therefore look for safer alternatives, which are 
typically large, net worth companies. Here, the assumption is small firms are riskier than larger 
firms, but what should be considered is that monetary policy is not limiting the profit seeking 
nature of these financial institutions. It is only taking away the credit extended to smaller firms 
and institutions, Minsky argued that small community banks were necessary in establishing 
stability in the economy but monetary policy affects their lending habits more so than the large 
too big to fail banks who can easily dilute regulatory policy by way of innovation. Also, smaller 
banks could be seen to have weaker balance sheets because they have less access to liquidity 
and limited capitalization, therefore, during monetary contraction they reduce the supply of their 
loans (Black and Rosen 2007). Research using bank size and liquidity to differentiate banks 
argues, “the lending of small banks with illiquid balance sheets should be most sensitive to 
changes in monetary policy because raising wholesale liabilities is costly for them” (Black and 
Rosen 2007). In dealing with the balance sheet channel “banks reallocate their loan supply away 
from small firms and towards large firms when monetary policy is tight” (Black and Rosen 
2007). This is known as a flight to quality. Essentially, what this means is that banks are looking 
to make safer loans during a time of monetary tightening because larger firms are deemed to be 
safer than smaller firms who have lower net worth, and therefore, higher agency costs. In the 
bank-lending channel the aggregate bank loan supply is reduced during periods of tight 
monetary policy, however, the balance sheet theory says that in tight monetary policy the bank 
loan supply is reallocated from small firms to large firms (Black and Rosen 2007). Small firms 
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are typically less diversified and have risker balance sheets, reducing the firms net worth. Large 
banks will choose to lend to larger firms in this case.  
 Further, banks can control the size of their portfolios by reducing or increasing the 
maturity on their loan obligations. Hence, a reduction in the maturity of its loan origination 
would reduce the length of time that its capital is invested in each project (Black and Rosen 
2007). A reduction in the maturity of loans over time is the same as a reduction in the supply of 
bank loans due to tight monetary policy. However, when the sample is split by maturity they 
find that “banks tend to reallocate their loan supply from long-term to short-term loans. This 
indicated a move towards greater liquidity in their portfolio which could be due to the increased 
costs of bank financing” (Black and Rosen 2007). Reducing the maturity of loans over time will 
reduce the supply of loans, however, it is not necessarily limiting the profit motives of banks. 
They simply reallocate their positions around the effects of monetary policy until their stance on 
interest rates change, and then adjust their positions. Also, in times of tight monetary policy 
banks will simply reallocate credit away from small firms in favor of large firms (Black and 
Rosen 2007). Studies have shown that a bank’s size is important in determining how sensitive 
its loan supply will be to monetary policy. In the article, it mentions that banks face lower costs 
to external financing then smaller banks do. In a study conducted by Kashyap and Stein, they 
found “the lending of large banks is not affected by monetary policy while the lending of small 
banks significantly declines when the nominal Federal Funds rate increases” (Black and Rosen 
2007). Therefore, banks increase their lending to large firms by reallocating to short-term 
lending from small to large firms. What the authors found was that “within the credit channel of 
monetary policy, the bank lending channel causes banks to reduce the maturity of their loans 
and the balance sheet channel causes banks to reallocate their short-term lending toward large 
firms” (Black and Rosen 2007).  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: FIANNACIAL INNOVATION 
 
Evolution From Neoclassical Theory: 
 Up until this point, I have provided a comprehensive survey of the literature surrounding 
the mainstream approach to monetary policy. Financial innovation does not just refer to the 
development in financial securities; it also refers to the changes in markets and the structure of 
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institutions. Financial innovation modifies the way financial systems interact and influences 
interest rates in the transmission of monetary policy. Financial innovation can reduce the 
effectiveness of monetary policy by weakening the relationships between interest rates and 
monetary aggregates as well as the definition of money, the money supply and the demand for 
money (Akhtar 1983). Financial innovation has widened the access of funds and, therefore, 
presents significant changes in the way institutions fund their clients and their own operations. 
Throughout history there has been a large increase in the use of interest rate sensitive funds by 
banks and other financial institutions. The idea is that banks and other financial institutions can 
generate a profit by “borrowing in short term markets, to finance loan demand and other 
activities” (Akhtar 1983). This can be referred to the idea of liability management, in which, the 
traditional role of bank deposits are reduced and there is an increasing role of purchased funds 
in order to fund the activities of financial institutions. Further, banks offer various types of cash 
management strategies at the firm and household level. Essentially, as individuals or businesses 
become concerned about earnings in an inflationary environment they will seek interest-earning 
instruments for their money and try to economize at the same time on non-interest bearing 
transactions (Akhtar 1983). Also, as interest rates become more relaxed through regulation this 
allows banks to utilize interest sensitive funds. Financial institutions are concerned with the 
protection of their investments however they need to innovate in order to stay competitive. 
Therefore, “banks and other financial institutions have found it necessary to match increasing 
interest-sensitive liabilities by stepping up variable rate lending and by reducing the maturity of 
loan contracts” (Akhtar 1983). In order for investors to be attracted there most be a supply of 
securities that is competitive enough to provide the same type of criteria with respect to 
liquidity, risk and maturity (Akhtar 1983). 
 Minsky notes throughout the evolution of the economy banks and other financial 
institutions have adopted financial instruments, usages and behaviors that change the nature of 
the economy or evolve in response to perceived profit opportunities (Minsky 1985). The 
financial world has been changing rapidly but many of the techniques and methods used by 
policy makers have remained the same without taking into consideration the effects of 
newfound innovations. Minsky noticed that the Neoclassical assumption of exogenous money is 
still widely relevant in economic qualities. Hence, he argued that there was not a well-defined, 
exogenously determined money supply that the Central Bank can control effectively (Minsky 
1985). The basis of Neoclassical theory does not take into consideration the profit maximizing 
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behavior of banks and other financial institutions. Monetary theory views banks as passive 
reactors that transform high-powered money into public money (Minsky 1985). However, in 
reality this is not true.  
 The profit seeking nature of banks can lead to great instances of instability. The Federal 
Reserve has a goal of influencing the economy to achieve a desired level of economic and 
monetary control (Minsky 1985). However, as we have seen throughout history, the Federal 
Reserve lacks effective monetary control to create a stable economy. The Federal Reserve faces 
a problem, such that, it has used its interventionist powers to “defend the integrity of the 
financial system by assuring that the nominal commitments of financial institutions on their 
liabilities are fulfilled” (Minsky 1985). This action results in a conflict between the Federal 
Reserve and its ability to maintain economic stability and the actions undertaken through the 
lender of last resort. Essentially, due to Neoclassical theory, the monetary authorities that 
believe an equilibrium point exists in the economy are fooled into believing that a situation of 
instability cannot be endogenously generated within the system that would require lender of last 
resort intervention (Minsky 1985). In the Neoclassical models, used to formulate monetary 
policy, banks are not taken into consideration. As Minsky has noted, through financial 
innovation the liability structure of our economy has become complex. The financial 
instruments utilized and portfolio structures of institutions have become increasingly 
interdependent. Therefore, the Neoclassical theory is unable to calculate the risks associated 
with financial innovations in their models. Consequently, Minsky debates whether or not the 
Central Bank’s lender of last resort function can effectively maintain economic stability.  
 What has been constituted as money in the past has rapidly changed throughout the 
evolution of the economy. Minsky noted that it is wrong to follow the view that money is 
exogenous and neutral. Money has evolved due to the profit seeking nature of banks and other 
financial institutions along with the income expenditure preferences associated with money 
issuing organizations (Minsky 1985). Minsky notes that the theory behind bank money has not 
changed but the way in which finance is acquired and assets are used has changed (Minsky 
1985). This is in turn affects the portfolio construction of banks as they are now involved in 
handling these new innovative instruments. Therefore, increasing the instability within the 
markets and the need for the lender of last resort function. Mainly, because businesses utilize 
innovative techniques to take on large amounts of debt, thereby, increasing their leverage ratios 
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to validate profits that must be used to eventually repay back their debt commitments. 
Therefore, the portfolio structure of banks cannot be ignored.  
 
Position-Making Instruments: 
 In a complex economy, capitalists “depend upon the pursuit of private incomes and 
wealth for the creation and maintenance of capital assets as well as for current production” 
(Minsky 1986a). Minsky views the economy as a system of “money in/money out transactions” 
(Minsky 1986a). Meaning, that each financial instrument “is a commitment to pay cash at some 
time” (Minsky 1986a). In order to meet these commitments financial institutions and 
intermediaries must have cash on hand to finance their debts. Accordingly, to obtain cash an 
institution can borrow, sell financial or physical assets, or use funds on hand from cash flows. 
However, banks and financial institutions can face shortages when they are required to make 
payments to service their debts. Well operating banks will “tend to hold cash or readily 
marketable assets, or will have some type of refinancing available” (Minsky 1986a).  
 If banks face a cash shortage they will borrow or sell a liquid asset to meet their 
obligations. This “act of acquiring cash to finance the assets essential to units business is called, 
following bank terminology, making a position, and the instruments used for such purposes is 
the position making instrument” (Minsky 1986a). Financial instruments that fall into this class 
are typically liquid and have a broad market with little volatility. When innovation occurs in the 
market, new instruments are created and used as position-making instruments, however, the 
nature of these instruments can generate complexity amongst balance sheets and complicate 
liability structures so that if one unit defaults many others obligations can be affected.  
 
Financial Innovations: 
 In order for banks and other financial institutions to meet their obligations on debts, they 
must make positions within their portfolios to make payments. Financial innovation has added 
to the degree and complexity of position-making instruments. One of the earliest position-
making innovations was the creation of the Federal Funds market. Minsky mentioned that the 
original position-making instrument, known as the Treasury bill, was no longer the primary 
position-making instrument. At the end of World War II the Treasury market was the primary 
position-making market. Banks were able to buy and or sell Treasuries in the market depending 
if they had excess cash or a cash deficiency, respectively. During the postwar period, the 
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position-making instruments class “evolved from the simplicity of the Treasury bill’s monopoly 
as the position-making instrument to a complex situation in which a representative bank juggles 
its government security account or its Federal Funds positions, has large denomination 
certificates of deposits, repurchase agreements, Eurodollar borrowings (or sales) and borrowings 
at the Federal Reserve” (Minsky 1986a).  
 With more financial innovation comes a greater potential for instability and crisis. This 
is so because monetary policy is not able to affect the economy, as effectively when there are 
many options for banks to make positions. With the creation of the Federal Funds market banks 
were able to make positions by way of acting on the liability side of their balance sheets 
(Minsky 1985). As the amount of financial instruments used for position-making activity grows, 
liabilities increase and in a rising interest rate environment banks will begin to buy their 
liabilities creating a sensitive environment to operate in as they are subject to more volatility 
from making positions by placing liabilities (Minsky 1985).  Hence, the profit-seeking nature of 
banks entices them to increase their leverage ratios and find new innovative profit earning 
techniques. Due to high levels of debt, in an increasing interest rate environment, households 
and firm are required to pay back their commitments on liabilities. Therefore, less money is 
being deposited into banks and less economic activity is taking place. Hence, bankers must 
finance their positions by paying for depositors in either cash or services (Minsky 1985). The 
expense of acquiring funds and the difference between interest receipts is the banks fund income 
(Minsky 1985). This can be affected by the volatility of rising interest rates due to the fact that 
firms and households may default on their payments, causing banks to reconsider their lending 
standards (Minsky 1985). 
 
Commercial Paper: 
 One innovative development that emerged in the economy during the time of Minsky’s 
writing was the commercial paper market. Minsky notes that around the late 1960s the 
circulation of commercial paper had increased significantly. Commercial paper is typically a 
short-term instrument that is backed by unused lines of credit at banks (Minsky 1985). This line 
of credit at a bank offers the banks a source of fee income while at the same time it is a way of 
facilitating finance to bank customers when the demand for credit increases (Minsky 1985). 
Therefore, banks can refinance positions of their clients, acting as a lender of last resort in times 
of need. As we can see, in the example of the Liquidity Squeeze of 1970, the innovation of 
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commercial paper brought complexity to the liability structure of organizations as banks were 
acting as the lenders of last resort to their clients through complicated refinancing arrangements.  
 
The Eurodollar: 
 Another innovation that Minsky pointed out in his work was the creation of the 
Eurodollar. Essentially, this is the idea of international finance and the use of American dollars 
in foreign markets as the transaction currency involved in the financial agreements. Now, there 
exists a financial market that is internationalized so that banks abroad and other financial 
institutions are trading dollar denominated securities while they are not considered to be a part 
of the United States Charter Bank (Minsky 1985). Therefore, there exists a market that demands 
dollars, short-term government liabilities, and commercial paper all denominated in Untied 
States dollars (Minsky 1985).  
 There are three components which determine the way foreign banks can acquire United 
States dollars: First, the Central Banks dollar holdings, second, the swap arrangements between 
the Central Bank and the Federal Reserve, and third, the terms on which the Central Bank will 
make the United States dollar accessible (Minsky 1985). Therefore, the actions of the Federal 
Reserve directly affect the Central Bank of a foreign country and the way in which they can sell 
assets to member banks making the Federal Reserve the de facto lender of last resort to 
international banks (Minsky 1985). In foreign markets, assets of the United States are 
considered to be high-powered money and serve as a stabilizing factor to the foreign economies. 
So, because the Federal Reserve is the de facto lender of last resort to all dollar denominated 
markets, they have responsibilities in markets in which they have no control over (Minsky 
1985). Therefore, if there is a run on the Central Banks of the foreign markets it will impact the 
banking system in the United States as well, which can lead to a collapse. 
 How does this innovation lead to instability? It comes down to the concept of debt 
financing. Dollars must be acquired by businesses to repay the debts owed to banks and other 
lenders. Minsky makes the distinction between investment and gross profits, which can be seen 
in much of Kalecki’s work. For instance, if we assume that gross profits is equivalent to gross 
investment, and if profits decline, then businesses will not be able to fulfill their debts to the 
bank due to the fact that the fulfillment of payments requires that new debts are able to be 
booked (Minsky 1985). 
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 Essentially, what emerged was a large increase in indebtedness by both domestic and 
foreign markets. Due to this, there was a higher rate of default on payment commitments. 
Essentially, if we assume that bank money is inflationary and the destruction of money is 
deflationary, then the more people default on their debts the higher the level of inflation will be, 
reducing the quality of bank money (Minsky 1985). Now, consider the situation the monetary 
authorities are left with. In an inflationary environment, the main policy tool that the Federal 
Reserve will use is to hike interest rates, resulting in large-scale unemployment and appreciation 
of the dollar (Minsky 1985). However, the appreciation of the dollar in the United States is very 
much linked to those dollar denominated markets in foreign countries, thereby, increasing the 
price level of their economies and potentially generating instability within the systems abroad.  
 
Shadow Banks: 
 Another, financial innovation that led to instability in the economy was the growing 
number of  “fringe” bank institutions or otherwise know as shadow banks. In this case, “money 
market banks are the lender of last resort to the fringe banks that operate on lines of credit” 
(Minsky 1986a). Indirectly, the Federal Reserve acts as the lender of last resort, due to the fact 
that the financial institutions are intertwined. These fringe banks weaken the financial system 
because they have similar portfolio structures compared to institutional banks so “some assets 
held by banks are weakened when the losses and cash-flow shortfalls of the fringe institutions 
become apparent to the market. Consequently, the already weakened portfolios of some banks 
are made even weaker when these banks act as the proximate lender of last resort to fringe 
institutions” (Minsky 1986a). The layering of financial institutions and financial innovation in 
position-making instruments increases the potential for financial crises and fragility of the 
economy.  
 
Securitization: 
 In the economy, the actual owners of wealth do not own capital assets that are used in 
production, rather they own various financial instruments, which have claims on the financial 
instruments (Minsky 1986b). This adds another complex dimension into the economy because 
the financial structure evolves as bankers and businessmen seek profits by way of financial 
innovation in instruments, institutions and in liabilities (Minsky 1986b). Minsky had noted long 
before the recent Global Financial Crisis that securitization and the creation of commercial 
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paper was extremely likely to cause a financial crisis (Minsky 1987). Essentially securitization 
altered the way the market and financial institutions fund their investment. Minsky saw that 
securitization was a lagged response to monetarism (Minsky 1987). The monetarist way of 
fighting inflation would be to hike interest rates in order to affect the expectations of economic 
units in the economy. However, Minsky mentioned that this intervention generates profit 
opportunities for innovative financing techniques as banks are subsequently put at a competitive 
disadvantage (Minsky 1987).  
 This development began in the mortgage market in the United States. Securitization 
allows banks and shadow banks to create mortgages even when their funding capabilities are 
compromised (Minsky 1987). This innovation was a result of the costly nature of banking 
liability structure. Minsky noted that banks “seem to need a 450 basis point margin if fund 
income is to be the source of profits” (Minsky 1987). Essentially, this allows banks to deal with 
the costs of banking by supplementing fund income with fee income (Minsky 1987). What does 
securitization imply for the structure of the Economy? As we can see from the global financial 
crisis, securitization within the mortgage market led to a system wide collapse. Further, what 
securitization does is it lowers the obligation of the Central Bank and its commitment to protect 
the financial structure of the economy (Minsky 1987). This means that the holders of these 
securities need to protect the market value of their assets, otherwise, an increase in interest rates 
will result in holders having to make positions by selling positions, which can lead to a dramatic 
decrease in the value of the securities and result in a downturn or panic (Minsky 1987). 
 
Effects Of Financial Innovation: 
 Everyone can admit that financial markets have grown and evolved overtime.  
Essentially, existing markets have expanded, new financial markets have emerged, and 
secondary markets for many instruments have developed (Akhtar 1983). New markets such as 
short-term money markets have been rapidly developing since around the 1970s. Also, the 
medium and long-term markets have been expanding. M.A. Akhtar shows that the United States 
expanded its domestic bond market by 106.7 percent of its total bonds outstanding around the 
late 1970s. Furthermore, in the United States we have seen the development of new markets for 
financial futures. This is also known as the development of secondary markets, and with these 
markets come new trading instruments and high trading volume. Further, the growth in 
marketable credit instruments means that the risk is that of the “ultimate lenders or owners of 
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claims and the liquidity [are] provided by the maturity of claims and secondary markets” 
(Akhtar 1983). With the development of marketable credit instruments it gave rise to direct 
financing through the markets instead of relying on financial institution intermediation.  
 Correspondingly, the rise of markets for financial futures, options and index stock 
futures “have brought higher liquidity and new ways to hedge risk but they have also increased 
speculative activity” (Akhtar 1983). The cost of speculating in financial markets is much less 
than doing so in the cash market. But how does this speculation become limited through the 
effects of monetary policy? As the financial instruments become more diverse the composition 
of portfolios will change. Financial innovation has made credit available to borrowers who may 
not have direct access to markets, and also, provides them with a source of funds. As financial 
change is occurring banks and non-banks have been competing against each other, utilizing 
electronic technology, seeking higher yielding assets and offering more sophisticated financial 
services (Akhtar 1983). Banks are also seeing competition from non-financial institutions and 
shadow banks that are offering near like financial services, typically offered by banks. This 
results in increased competition and banks are at a disadvantage due to rules and regulations, 
therefore, banks must circumvent regulation to stay competitive or policy makers relax 
regulation. However, when regulation does not limit the speculative activity of banks and the 
profit motive we end up in cases such as the Global Financial Crisis and the JPMorgan London 
Whale Scandal. 
 Financial innovation is important and significant because it makes it more difficult to 
measure or define monetary aggregates. This is so because it is difficult to determine the degree 
of monyness or means of payment and the liquidity of a wide array of financial instruments 
(Akhtar 1983). With rapid change and innovation the definition of monetary aggregates can be 
changing and difficult to measure. Essentially, this is the case because financial instruments that 
have both investment features (bearing market related interest rates) and transaction features are 
becoming very common (Akhtar 1983). This could be overnight repurchase agreements, money 
market mutual funds, Eurodollars and more. It is important to note that there is a wide array of 
financial instruments, which offer liquidity by way of secondary markets, and the shortening of 
maturities. This makes the definitions associated with monetary aggregates difficult to 
determine and sometimes meaningless. Financial innovation has also reduced transaction costs 
allowing for greater use and mobility of financial instruments. When transaction costs decline it 
widens the spectrum of financial instruments that can be used for making payments and or for 
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providing different grades of liquidity (Akhtar 1983). This makes the liquidity and degree of 
monyness of the financial instruments difficult to determine.  
 There are two ways that the supply of money or liquidity is influenced. The first deals 
with changes in currency and the reserve ratios at a certain interest rate and the other are directly 
linked to interest rate movements (Akhtar 1983). Financial transformations have put upward 
pressures on the size of the money and reserve multipliers such that innovations are reducing the 
public’s currency holdings and lower yielding transaction balances, relative to total deposits, or 
financial assets (Akhtar 1983). The “upward pressures on the money and reserve multipliers are 
also caused by the fact that the effective reserve ratio against any given category of deposits 
tends to fall as the public shifts funds into substitute investments with no reserve requirements 
or low reserve requirements” Such instruments have been noted above (Akhtar 1983). When 
investments are shifted to financial substitutes, such as money market mutual funds, it shows 
significant changes in the money and reserve multipliers underlying the broadest categories M3, 
or liquidity, compared to M1 (Akhtar 1983). What was found is that the multipliers of the 
broadest category, or liquid financial instruments, have risen faster than the multipliers of M1. 
What this means is that the “the supply schedules for both the narrow and broad monetary 
aggregates are tending to shift to the right, i.e. the financial system is willing to provide higher 
amounts of transactions and other balances at a given level of interest” (Akhtar 1983). With 
financial innovation it has become difficult to determine when these movements will occur 
because in the short-term, the currency and reserve ratio sizes are unpredictable.  
 As we noted before, the Neoclassical approach utilizes monetary policy to control the 
money supply, however, as the system becomes more competitive lending and borrowing rates 
can adjust more quickly. Therefore, the rate of interest has a very small effect on the money 
supply. Financial intermediaries issue credit based off the spread on interest rates charged on 
loans and paid to deposits (Akhtar 1983). Likewise, non-deposit financial instruments are 
responsive to the costs of raising funds relative to rates. Therefore, as rates adjust quickly there 
is little effect on the spreads, meaning that interest rates are more responsive to differences 
between borrowing and lending rates. However, innovation and competition can make the 
transmission of interest rates to financial behavior difficult. There are two main reasons why 
broader monetary aggregates are demanded over M1. First, the shift from lower yielding 
financial instruments to higher yielding financial instruments are putting upward pressure on the 
demand for those broader aggregates where higher yielding instruments are included (Akhtar 
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1983). Secondly, there is an increase of new financial instruments with market related interest 
rates outside those considered to be the broad monetary aggregates which, closely substitute for 
financial assets. Therefore, the demand for these financial instruments is putting downward 
pressure on the demand for the broad aggregates (Akhtar 1983). 
 It is important to note that these influences are unpredictable over time and can generate 
instability within the system, specifically in the short run. M.A. Akhtar notes that a large reason 
for this is due to financial innovation within the financial system, which has increased the 
instability of money demand. Basically, the demand for money has becomes less sensitive to 
interest rates in the economy. Essentially, monetary policy’s interest rate transmission 
mechanism, which has been heavily relied on by Neoclassical and mainstream economists, is 
deteriorating. Now, there are many financial instruments that act as substitutes to other market 
related instruments. Thus, giving no incentive to shift in to or out of instruments whose returns 
are similar to those that move in line with the general level of interest rates (Akhtar 1983). The 
author mentions that “the increasing use of instruments with market related interest payments is 
making the demand for money, especially for broader aggregates, less sensitive to the general 
level of interest rates” (Akhtar 1983). In the Hicksian IS-LM model this would mean that the 
LM schedule is shifting to the right or the left unpredictably and the slope is becoming steeper 
(Akhtar 1983). Even the medium-term and long-term schedules are becoming more difficult to 
predict, due to financial innovation.   
 In dealing with the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy to the economy 
financial change has weakened the significance of this policy tool. As we noted before, 
monetary policy works through the interest rate channel or the credit channel. The use of credit 
rationing has weakened, due to the fact that there are many instruments with market related 
interest rates. M.A. Akhtar notes that the changes in interest rates tend to spread very quickly 
and the impact has increased, related to credit rationing. I would argue that financial innovation 
has allowed banks to hedge their portfolios against unfavorable movements in interest rates 
through the use of unique innovative instruments, like interest rate swaps. The author argues 
that over time, interest rate elasticities in the components of final demand will increase in the 
long run. This is so because as credit rationing declines, there is a stronger effect through the 
interest rate channel because the credit-rationing component limits credit to certain sectors and, 
therefore, protects them from price and interest rate effects (Akhtar 1983). However without the 
non-price credit-rationing channel in effect the interest rates would have to move substantially 
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in order to achieve any real impact in monetary change. Monetary policy is limited in its effect 
due to “the increased difficulties of identifying and measuring monetary aggregates, by the 
greater instability and unpredictability of the demand for money and of the money supply 
process in part reflecting the shifts in the currency and reserve ratios and by the declining 
interest rate elasticity of money demand” (Akhtar 1983). Further, as mentioned before, the 
unpredictable shifts in the money supply in the short-term make it difficult to target, and 
because interest rate elasticities are low, monetary policy has a limited significance in 
controlling the money stock. Hence, the Neoclassical approach utilized by many mainstream 
economists does not fully translate its significance to the real economy.   
 This unpredictability generates instability within the system because it becomes less 
clear as to how monetary policy is affecting the economy and in determining how monetary 
variables of the economy will react. The money demand functions have become unpredictable 
as a result of financial innovation. Now the use of financial instruments is vast and many banks 
and financial institutions are widely diversified making it difficult for monetary policy to 
influence the way they interact in the financial system. Financial innovation has also caused 
banks to stay competitive in order to keep up with other unregulated institutions. As pricing of 
financial securities become more accurate there exists lower spreads between obtaining funds 
and the lending rate, which will in turn generate instability, because at the low yielding rates, 
financial institutions are not earning enough. Therefore, they resort to further complicated 
techniques to satisfy their profit motives. This ties in nicely with Minsky’s view of financial 
instability and Money Manager Capitalism.  
 
Institutional Innovations: 
 There are two ways in which financial institutions can evolve in the market. The first is 
through legislation, which is typically a result of some malfunctioning within the economy, and 
the other deals with innovations within the money market, as a way of generating profits 
(Minsky 1957). In dealing with financial innovation, Minsky emphasized that the reaction of 
policy to these innovations must be examined. We have seen throughout history that the markets 
and financial instruments being used have grown rapidly but the monetary authorities have done 
little to make any significant impacts in the way they control inflation and debt accumulation in 
the economy. In the time of Minsky, and to current day practices, financial innovations occur 
during times of rising interest rates, as the demand for finance outweighs the supply of finance 
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(Minsky 1957). Minsky disagreed that monetary policy was effective in controlling inflationary 
pressures and halting depression. Central Banks believe that an increase in bank loans would 
generate inflationary pressure, so instead, they constrain bank reserves resulting in higher 
interest rates (Minsky 1957). However, as we noted before, when interest rates are increased, 
this opens up innovative profit seeking motives by financial institutions in order to increase the 
supply of finance. 
 In a rising rates environment business and households typically become more 
conservative so there must be an increase in the velocity of loanable funds in order to offset the 
effects of tight monetary policy (Minsky 1957). With an increase in the velocity of loanable 
funds, there will be an increase in lending, therefore, tight monetary policy will be effective in a 
rising rate environment and the demand for financing will be restricted to the inelastic supply of 
funds (Minsky 1957). However, what is important to note is that higher interest rates impacts 
the lenders as well. In times of high interest rates, institutions will seek out new profit 
opportunities to finance their operations. As Minsky notes, the money market is highly 
competitive, hence, it is a more favorable environment for innovative ideas when interest rates 
rise and funds need to be generated (Minsky 1957). Thus, the institutional innovations during 
times of monetary constraints are those that increase velocity and shift the velocity-interest rate 
relationship to the right (Minsky 1957). Minsky defines the velocity-interest rate relation as “the 
sum of the effect of a change in interest rates within unchanging institutional arrangements and 
the effects of changes in institutions” (Minsky 1957). So, when there is an innovation present in 
the economy the net effect can be compared to a velocity curve that is infinitely elastic (Minsky 
1957). This relationship can be depicted below in the following graph from (Minsky 1957).  
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Figure 1: Institutional Change and Velocity 
 
 
 
Source: Hyman P. Minsky Archive. Paper 194 
 As we can see in the graph, the relationship between the velocity and the interest rate 
represents a step function. If we start at an interest rate point on the graph denoted by 𝑟!, and 
then move up to a higher interest rate level denoted by 𝑟!, the liquidity trap generated from the 
difference between the two will cause institutions to innovate, represented by the curve Ι, and 
eventually the innovation shifts the velocity-interest rate relation to curve ΙI (Minsky 1957). 
Further, at the higher interest rate level, remaining constant, the movement shows the 
corresponding amount of lending associated with an increase in velocity from point 𝑎 to point 𝑏, 
as institutional innovation begins to affect the market (Minsky 1957). In order for restrictive 
monetary policy to be effective, it must be able to “offset the rise in velocity by decreasing the 
quantity of reserves” (Minsky 1957). Therefore, constraints such as restricting the quantity of 
money will not be useful in preventing inflation. The Central Bank must act strongly in order to 
decrease the money supply; otherwise innovation will generate counteracting forces to the 
policy interventions. As velocity increases, the amount of money is not increasing, but 
institutional innovators find new substitutes to use as cash assets, ultimately, decreasing the 
liquidity of the economy (Minsky 1957). Essentially, the replacement of cash with liquid assets 
and debt increases the risk of the overall economy and can affect the solvency and liquidity of 
the financial institutions (Minsky 1957). Therefore, “if, during a long prosperity, monetary 
policy is used to restrain inflation, a number of such velocity-increasing and liquidity-decreasing 
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money-market innovations will take place” (Minsky 1957). As a result, liquidity is decreased 
and the money market begins to become unstable which can result in a financial crisis. As we 
can see from this argument, financial innovation has been used to reduce the impacts of 
monetary policy.  
 However, if banks are financing too much activity, the Orthodox approach to fixing the 
problem of too much lending would be to raise the Federal Reserves target rate (Wray 2010). 
Rates must rise sharply because borrowing is not very interest rate sensitive especially in an 
upswing (Wray 2010). Interest rate hikes are in opposition with the Federal Reserves goal of 
maintaining financial stability because they cause financial disruption (Wray 2010). Small rate 
hike targets allow for markets to have time to prepare and compensate for the effect, making the 
impact less. Therefore, rate hikes are not an appropriate way of controlling bank lending (Wray 
2010).  
 As financial innovation takes place there is a wider range of risk that is spread out 
throughout the economy. It can be beneficial to transfer the risk to different parties but it also 
may be a source of instability. Hence, “the dispersal of risks throughout the system has benefits 
only to the extent that risks are shifted to parties that have the knowledge and wherewithal to 
bear them, not just that risks exit the banking sector” (Lumpkin 2009). Financial innovation 
gives market participants the belief that short-term profits are capable of being made. The issue 
is that these innovations tend to result in busts and are often the cause of the development of 
financial instability. This is something that Minsky has noted long before, that stems from the 
profit motives of financial institutions and the competitive nature of Money Manager 
Capitalism. Essentially, financial instability has “often been preceded by some form of market 
innovation that altered the nature of competition and gave rise to subsequent adverse 
consequences” (Lumpkin 2009). It is important that authorities are aware of the effects of 
financial innovation and the risks that come along with them. Market risks have changed as the 
economy has developed and balance sheets have become more complex. Therefore, more 
complex ways are been undertaken in order to hedge against the effects of increased trading 
activity and techniques of trade. We have seen in the past how innovations have led to certain 
crises and scandals, such as, the Global Financial Crisis and the JPMorgan London Whale 
Scandal both of which resulted in harmful courses of action for the economic system and for the 
financial industry. It is essential that there is a degree of oversight in dealing with financial 
innovation and an awareness of the harm these practices and new financial products can cause.  
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CHAPTER 3: REGULATION UNDER FIANCNAIL INNOVATION 
 
Difficulties In Regulating Too Big To Fail: 
 Financial innovation is natural in the economy and is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Innovation has a positive aspect “by lowering the costs and broadening the menu of financial 
products and services available to ultimate savers, ultimate borrowers and other market 
participants” (Lumpkin 2009). Also, more individuals and companies have access to credit in 
the system through the new channels of distribution brought upon by financial innovation. 
Therefore, policy will not be effective in limiting the growth of financial innovation. Rather, 
there should be more supervision as to what is being developed, but the overall idea of 
innovation should not be stopped. Policy should help avoid systemic risk “preventing 
disruptions at individual institutions and markets from propagating and spilling over to 
disinterested third parties and the broader economy” (Lumpkin 2009). Preventing failures at 
financial institutions will then in turn help prevent failures in the market. The issue authorities 
have is deciding when to intervene and when not to. This is mainly due to a question of the size 
of the financial institution. Smaller institutions will be left to fail because it will not pose a 
threat to the overall system, however, when banks that are considered to be too big to fail are in 
serious trouble the government must intervene, like we saw in the Global Financial Crisis.  
 Essentially, when potential risks are present that threaten governments safety nets, the 
government must intervene and ultimately bail them out. But this action does not help teach the 
large institutions a lesson because they know that the government will be there to bail them out, 
causing them to be less prudent about what they are investing in. If large institutions are not 
allowed to fail abruptly then there will be excessive risk taking and then creditors will not 
withdraw their funds. If there is suspicion that improper behavior is being conducted, it can act 
as market discipline that is used to keep banks honest but, ultimately, minuscule when creditors 
know the government will bail them out (Lumpkin 2009). In order for the market discipline 
function to work properly, “participants must believe that it will be possible for institutions to 
fail, regardless of their size or degree of interconnectedness, with obvious negative 
consequences for creditors and investors” (Lumpkin 2009). Therefore, the too big to fail 
approach must be abandoned and the size of the large banks should be reduced to ensure that a 
failure by one institution will not bring down the whole system. It is important that the 
management and supervisors of these financial institutions are aware of the risks that they bear. 
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New financial products are often based on complex derivatives and rely heavily on market 
liquidity, which can make the balance sheet vulnerable in times of stress, like in the case of the 
JPMorgan London whale scandal (Lumpkin 2009). Therefore, these risk exposers are complex 
and can “affect both sides of an institutions balance sheet and cut across it constituent entities, 
such that aggregate risk for the entity as a whole can exceed the sum of the risk exposure of 
individual units” (Lumpkin 2009). Therefore, it is critical that it is clear what the risks are to the 
firm and how to hedge against those risks. Also, it is critical that the authorities are aware of the 
financial innovations being developed in order to understand what the ultimate risks are and to 
help prevent harm to the system. With innovation, regulation must adapt constantly. This is so 
because “there can be a considerable delay between the introduction of a new product and the 
emergence of problems. Thus, a determination that an existing policy approach is sufficient 
should be based on a sound analytical foundation” (Lumpkin 2009). However, overly detailed or 
too restrictive regulatory measures may limit the financial institutions to respond to changes in 
their composition, ultimately, leading them to become unprofitable and unsafe.  
 Bernanke saw the benefits and limitations of financial innovation. Financial innovation 
to him allowed for the “increasing sophistication and depth of financial market[s] promot[ing] 
economic growth by allocating capital where it can be most productive” (Bernanke 2007). Also, 
risk is more easily dispersed across the financial system allowing for the economy to strengthen 
and reduce the shocks it undergoes. When regulation is imposed it should “preserve the benefits 
of the financial innovation even as we address the risks that may accompany that innovation” 
(Bernanke 2007). Innovative techniques such as hedge funds and credit derivatives can be 
complex and have many characteristics. Therefore, a single class of financial instruments cannot 
be focused on, the objective of the financial innovation needs to be considered from a broad 
perspective and then a regulatory proposal can be used to effect the system as a whole. Large 
financial institutions are at the core of the financial system and regulators should provide 
supervisory authority to ensure that they manage their risks in a safe manner. Bernanke states 
that in order “to avoid moral hazard and to let market discipline work, investors must be allowed 
to bear the consequence of the decisions they make and the risk they accept” (Bernanke 2007). 
Financial innovation has made risk management easier by allowing risk to be sliced and diced, 
moved off balance sheets and hedged by a derivative instrument (Bernanke 2007). Risk is now 
capable of being shared and spread out more effectively but it poses some difficulties. For 
instance, the complexity of financial innovation “amplifies the difficulty of measuring risk, both 
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market risk and counterparty credit risk” (Bernanke 2007). Next, there is the issue of illiquidity 
because substantial market risk may be associated with holdings of illiquid instruments 
(Bernanke 2007). Next, the leverage that can be utilized with new financial instruments can 
make it difficult to manage risk. This also poses a threat to investors because they may not be 
able to assess the risk associated with the complex and intertwined financial instruments and 
strategies.  
 As history has shown, strict regulation and laws are not the most effective way of 
controlling financial innovation and conducting policy. We have seen that in high inflation 
environments, during most of the World War II period, high interest rates don’t necessarily 
result in the appropriate response to economic issues. This is so because in that time there were 
rules and regulations put in place where “the yields that depository institutions could pay were 
limited by prohibitions or ceilings on the payment of explicit interest, and also by requirements 
to hold non interest-bearing reserves, which reduce the rate of return on the investment of 
deposit proceeds” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1982). Also, long-term 
assets that are held by firms limit their ability to pay at prevailing interest rates because they 
were purchased when inflation levels were low, along with the interest rate. Therefore, “as the 
public has become increasingly sensitive to the earnings lost by holding non-interest bearing or 
low yielding deposits, they have become more adept at economizing on cash balances and more 
receptive to new kinds of financial innovation” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 1982). With this came a new demand and banks had to find new sources of liquidity 
which, ultimately, came from them operating on the liability side of their balance sheets. When 
regulation is too strict the opportunity for innovation is heightened as banks are constantly 
innovating around regulation to stay relevant. In the past, “the increased competition for savings 
of individuals has forced the financial regulatory authorities to accelerate the liberalization of 
ceiling rates on their small-denominated time deposits” (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 1982). As innovation continues, the definition of money becomes harder to 
distinguish and, therefore, the ability of the monetary authorities to influence the economy and 
control the money stock is reduced. Commonly, financial innovation “has made the dividing 
line between money and other financial assets conceptually more arbitrary” (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1982). An example of an innovation that has reduced 
the impact of the Federal Reserves policy is, money market funds. One such example is the 
sweep account used by banks and financial institutions. These accounts allow “funds to move 
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automatically into or out of conventional transaction balances to investment accounts paying 
market rates of return” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1982). Due to this, 
“they effectively remove transaction balances from the reserve requirements of the Federal 
Reserve” (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1982). As Minsky has noted, 
innovation and the profit seeking nature of banks and financial institution has increased the 
fragility of the financial system. Therefore, monetary policy is crucial to ensure the system runs 
efficiently and attempts to limit the impact of potential disaster. 
 One such disaster was the Global Financial Crisis that commenced during 2008. After 
this crisis, regulators had to find new approaches to make the system more stable. It was argued 
that banks had become too large and too complex, something that Minsky had highlighted in 
much of his writing on the financial system. In order to prevent another crisis, regulators 
required banks to go through stress tests. In this process, “the regulators deliberately did not 
communicate the exact things the banks needed to do for their plans to pass muster” (Eavis 
2016). Essentially, every year, regulatory stress tests “assess how large banks would bear up 
under theoretical crashes in the markets and global economy” (Eavis 2016). When the banks fail 
the stress tests they are not allowed to distribute money to shareholders or buy back shares 
(Eavis 2016). Ultimately, this process keeps banks honest with the risks they are undertaking 
and the overall stability of their institution. Further, regulators utilized a strategy known as a 
banks living will, which is a component of the Dodd-Frank Act. It helps determine what is 
necessary for banks to survive if the economy undergoes another financial crisis. Another 
component of the Dodd-Frank Act is to seek out new risks within the financial system. 
However, as the financial system starts to stabilize, the regulators will begin to believe that the 
system is stable and that risks have been constrained, causing them to overlook new risks, 
something that Minsky would warn about in his writing (Eavis 2016). 
 
Minsky’s Perspective On Financial Regulation:  
 During the 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on The State of the US and World 
Economies the panel discussed the future of financial regulation after the Global Financial Crisis 
and what needed to be done to regulate the financial institutions, and more importantly, banks 
that are considered to be too big to fail. Regulation is not capable of preventing the next 
financial crisis but it can help limit the damage. This is so because “banks carry an urge to 
evolve in a way that maximizes revenue” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015). 
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The result of regulation is that banks will come up with new risky instruments in order to 
generate a profit. As the cost of banking increases due to regulation, banks will try and evade 
the effects. Essentially, “expanded activity impacts the banks size and interconnectedness with 
other institutions, perpetuating the concern about being too big to fail and the de facto 
assumption of government support in future crisis” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 
2015). Minsky noted that the financial system was complex and prone to instability that was 
created endogenously within the system which macroeconomic policy could not completely 
control. Minsky would have proposed that in order to enhance the financial system banks would 
have to be broken down into smaller units and, macro-prudential regulation must be dynamic to 
supervise and examine banks (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015). Minsky 
advocated, limiting the profits of banks without promoting speculation by the banks. Essentially, 
it’s crucial that banks “can earn competitive rates of return, but that also focus on financing 
capital development, not on big risks” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015).  
 In one of the speeches James Bullard notes a crucial aspect as to why policy needs to be 
dynamic and forward looking. In order to prepare for the next financial crisis, it is appropriate to 
start looking at policy now for the future because “there are lags in monetary policy, so you 
want to start moving now so that you are in a good position a couple of years from now” (24th 
Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015). Another panelist, Tomas M. Hoeing believes that 
regulatory relief should be provided on the basis of the complexity and activity of the banks 
rather than just strictly size. Essentially, “for the vast majority of commercial banks that stick to 
traditional banking activities, and conduct their activities in a safe and sound manner with 
sufficient capital reserves, the regulatory burden should be eased. For the small handful of firms 
that have elected to expand their activities beyond commercial banking, supported with the 
subsidies that arise from the bank’s access to the safety net, the additional regulatory burden is 
theirs to bear” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015).  
 Elizabeth Warren also joined the discussion stressing the importance of government 
regulation within financial markets. Discussed, were two main principles she believed were 
crucial to the stability of the financial system. The first, deals with transparency between 
investors and what they are investing in. Basically, “markets work only if people can see and 
understand the products they are buying, only if people can reasonably compare one product to 
another, only if people can’t get fooled into taking on far more risk than they realize, just so that 
some fly-by-night company can turn a quick profit and move on” (24th Annual Hyman P. 
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Minsky Conference 2015). Secondly, Warren believes that “financial institutions shouldn’t be 
allowed to get the tax payers to pick up their risks” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 
2015). Essentially, she is eluding the phenomena of the government bailing out these large 
financial institutions and preventing them from failing. Much of the speakers at the Hyman P. 
Minsky conference noted the problem with banks and their size. Warren notes that, “when small 
banks break the law, their regulators do not hesitate to shut down the banks, toss their 
executives in jail, and put their employees out of work” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky 
Conference 2015). This is not the case for large financial institutions. When these financial 
institutions are not punished for breaking the law they have no reason to change their actions 
and will continually do so. Even after the Dodd-Frank laws were passed we have seen scandals 
persistent in the financial system. For example, the JPMorgan London Whale Scandal utilized 
derivatives speculation to generate six billion dollars in losses on their balance sheet and the 
senior management alleged that they were unaware of what was going on. The reality is banks 
are still too big to fail and just as risky as they were even after the Dodd-Frank Act changed the 
financial landscape. Warren proposed to break up the biggest banks so that no bank is 
considered to be too big to fail. Regulatory solutions do not always work against banks that are 
large because the affects are “diluted over time with loopholes, carve-outs, and rollbacks each of 
which favor a few well connected firms over everyone else” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky 
Conference 2015). When banks are broken up they will be forced to bear the consequences of 
their risky actions which will allow the regulation of banks to be lessened because they will be 
less likely to put themselves in harms way when the government is not there to bail them out.  
 Minsky once noted, “an economy with capitalist institutions is fundamentally flawed in 
the sense that financial innovation will always be emerging to create instability” (24th Annual 
Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015). During the conference Jan Kregel notes that regulation 
alone is not sufficient to prevent a serious financial crisis (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky 
Conference 2015). He then referred to a concept of the two “Minsky Maxims.” The first, echoes 
similarly to the previous panelists in the sense that regulation must be dynamic and adapt to 
innovation and the changing financial system, due to the fact that innovation is occurring 
alongside regulatory changes. Secondly, Kregel points out that the Central Bank should not be 
responsible for both financial stability and macroeconomic policy, rather the monetary 
authorities should focus on the stability of the system. Essentially, Minsky noted that in dealing 
with monetary policy, undertaken in response to changes in the real sector of the economy, 
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“could alter banks’ business models, transforming the financial structure in the direction of 
greater fragility” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015). Kregel noted that higher 
capital requirements are not a suitable response to control the profit seeking nature of banks. 
Basically, they only make it more difficult for banks to earn a competitive return on their 
capital, leading to more heightened financial innovation and speculative activity, further, 
increasing the financial fragility in the system. Fundamentally, “these regulatory and monetary 
policies might increase stability for five or six years, eventually banks will be forced to resort to 
fragility-increasing activities to produce the returns on equity that would justify the higher 
capital ratios imposed on them” (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 2015). Therefore, 
banks will only be able to raise more capital through more risky practices.  
 Further, Kregel noted that it is important to not just regulate the banking sector, but also, 
those institutions that create liquidity and leverage because these institutions operate outside of 
bank regulation by acting as shadow banks with similar activities. Randall L. Wray emphasizes 
this notion as Minsky’s concept of Money Manager Capitalism where unregulated shadow 
banks heighten the financial fragility in the economy as the financial sector has an inability to 
finance the capital development of the economy (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 
2015). Wray noted the dangers lingering within our financial system. Specifically, there still are 
“systemically dangerous institutions (what others call “too big to fail”) and worrisome off-
balance sheet activities that are not being included in capital ratios” (24th Annual Hyman P. 
Minsky Conference 2015). Wray goes on to propose that capital ratios, living wills, and “skin in 
the game” are not sufficient enough to regulate financial institutions. What he believes is that 
banks must retain risk and be reoriented towards relationship banking (24th Annual Hyman P. 
Minsky Conference 2015). Bailouts are not a prominent response, rather, the lender of last resort 
function must be limited and tougher collateral requirements must be imposed, essentially, he 
advocates that the layering and leverage ratios in the financial sector must be reduced in order 
for the Central Banks to better supervise the system (24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference 
2015).  
 I believe that it is crucial for the banks considered to be too big to fail to be broken up 
into smaller banks and at the same time the Federal Reserve should open the discount window 
to financial institutions in order to supervise the books of banks and shadow banks more closely. 
This stance is one of Minsky’s and one that I believe is critical in restoring financial stability 
within our economic system. Minsky discussed the changing relationships between businesses 
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and banks caused by the deregulation of financial intuitions and innovations in the markets. As 
the complexity of the financial system progresses, the role of monetary authorities and their 
policy tools become more important due to the fact that instability results from the profit 
seeking motives of these financial institutions. Therefore, the Central Bank’s responsibilities of 
the lender of last resort and behaviors come into conflict due to the fact that they cannot allow 
large banks to firmly believe the government will protect them, support their operations and 
refinance them in times of crisis (Minsky 1985). These institutions have the ability to bias their 
asset and liability innovations toward instruments that compromise their liquidity and equity 
while still being protected by the government because they are considered too big to fail and a 
crash by one bank would result in system wide collapse (Minsky 1985). However, Minsky 
believed that the government should not be afraid to call the banks bluffs and allow them to 
default and wipe out the equity of shareholders and the depositors accounts (Minsky 1985). Yet, 
Minsky noticed that this was not practical due to the fact that these banks have grown so large 
and have intertwined portfolio structures that could lead to a run on many banks. Hence, he 
believed that banks should be reduced in size so that the Federal Reserve could allow the banks 
to fail with out generating a system wide collapse.   
 Minsky disagreed with the idea of increasing the required ratio of bank equity to bank 
assets. With increasing costs of acquiring funds, bank profitability becomes squeezed and banks 
yield lower returns on fee income (Minsky 1985). However, the notion that stricter capital 
requirements would reduce moral hazard in banking would be inefficient because banker would 
receive even lower profitability and the financial institutions need to be profitable in order to 
remain stable (Minsky 1985). If these requirements were put in place, banks would be forced to 
take on larger bets in order to stay competitive. Therefore, banks would innovate and increase 
risky practices. Therefore, Minsky recommended that the Federal Reserve shift away from open 
market operations and use the discount window as its main policy tool, opening it to other 
banks, so it can in essence, be the prime source of reserves. In doing so, “a shift to a greater use 
of the discount window as a normal source of bank reserves should diminish the destabilizing 
influences in our economy that are the result of too rapid an expansion of bank financing of 
business and asset holdings” (Wray 2016). 
 Directly after the Global Financial Crisis, Kregel noted that the problem of too big to fail 
banks was aggravated due to the fact that large banks were given government support while 
small and medium sized banks were resolved through the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation. Regulation intended to make the banks more safe, such as, liquidity requirements 
and increased capital requirements may be aggravating the too big to fail problem even more. 
Kregel notes three problems associated with the size of banks and the scope of reform in terms 
of reducing systemic risk. The first problem arises from multifunctional banking. Essentially, 
this has to do with the “inherent conflict of interest in serving the fiduciary interests of different 
clients” (Kregel 2009). Multifunctional banking takes away competition and generates 
fraudulent behavior because the best interest of the clients are no longer in the eyes of the banks 
who control the four distinct functions of banking which are commercial banking, trust and 
insurance, corporative underwriting and brokering (Kregel 2009). A second issue in regulating 
large banks deals with their concentration. Essentially, “banks concentration reduces the ability 
of market competition to ensure efficiency in providing banking services and allocating credit” 
(Kregel 2009). This leads to the problem of antitrust when banks control a large portion of the 
market due to their size. A third issue deals with the interconnectedness of banks. This is an 
issue that “has to do with the ability of the regulatory agency to rapidly resolve an institution 
that is exposed to a wide range of unrelated financial institutions operating in different financial 
markets” (Kregel 2009). This is closely related to the idea of multifunctioning banks where the 
large size of these banks is supposed to justify their existence.  
 Nevertheless, large financial institutions are not necessarily the best way to provide deep 
and broad markets. Kregel mentioned that this could be achieved by having numerous active 
and competitive financial institutions. Furthermore, “the support for a large number of financial 
intuitions is based on the idea that a multitude of buyers and sellers with diverse opinions is 
necessary in order to improve market efficiency in price discovery and provide market liquidity 
and stability” (Kregel 2009). Thus, a few numbers of financial institutions that are considered to 
be massive in size does not help contribute to the outcomes mentioned. Kregel mentions 
“multifunctional banking is the leading source of financial crisis, while large size contributes to 
contagion and systemic risk” (Kregel 2009). Therefore, he concludes that resolving large banks 
will not be sufficient to deal with the problem of multifunctional banks. Further, utilizing prior 
solutions like the 1933 Act in order to solve issues of the current financial system cannot be 
relied on. Instead, “the challenge is to provide solutions to the problems of multifunctional 
banking given the financial innovations and changes in banking practices since the beginning of 
deregulation in the 1970s” (Kregel 2009). 
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Chapter 4: Portfolio Hedging 
 
Financial Derivatives And Innovation:  
 One main example that I will examine is the JPMorgan London Whale Scandal. This 
scandal can be used to show how complex hedging techniques with innovative instruments can 
cause the financial system to transform into a state of fragility due to the profit seeking nature of 
these banks that are considered to be too big to fail. The main financial instrument used in this 
scandal was a financial derivative. A derivative allows for an institution to hedge their exposure 
by transferring “a specific risk of the underlying security from the buying agent to the selling 
agent” (Vrolijk 1997). Essentially, as financial institutions are able to hedge their risks there are 
more opportunities for growth within the institution. Derivatives also can have adverse 
consequences within the markets. Essentially, price movements are amplified due to dynamic 
hedging and there is systemic risk present as well (Vrolijk 1997). As institutions try and hedge 
their entire risk exposure the failure of one dealer can generate a system wide collapse (Vrolijk 
1997). Derivatives impact the way in which the traditional monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms reach the real economy. Hence, a derivative offers a new way to invest and save, 
ultimately, affecting the way in which traditional monetary policy impacts the economy. In 
dealing with the bank lending channel, we noted before that smaller firms will be impacted 
more so than larger firms due to the fact that larger firms have access to capital markets. 
Therefore, with the use of derivatives by firms and other financial institutions in the traditional 
bank-lending channel is reduced due to financial innovation. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) 
found that “from a high of 35 percent in 1974, bank lending fell to 22 percent of borrowing in 
1994. In so far, derivatives contributed to financial innovation by providing additional funding 
avenues, derivatives have reduced the importance of the bank-lending channel (Vrolijk 1997). 
 In this case, it is clear that the effect of monetary policy through the bank-lending 
channel has been reduced. Essentially, lending can even now be acquired through the shadow-
banking sector further depleting the role of monetary policy. As mentioned before, financial 
innovation makes it more difficult to define monetary aggregates. For example, derivatives can 
act as synthetic assets that are substitutes for real securities (Vrolijk 1997). For instance, “a 
portfolio containing a long bond position and short 3-month future on the bond is identical to a 
3-month time deposit. However, since the portfolio, or synthetic time deposit can be traded, it is 
substantially more liquid than a regular time deposit” (Vrolijk 1997). Nevertheless, the synthetic 
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asset is not included in the monetary aggregate referred to as M3. The less liquid time deposit 
would be included in the monetary aggregate measurement even though the synthetic instrument 
is more attractive and more liquid in the market. Essentially, “this will lower the accuracy of the 
strictly defined broad monetary aggregates in estimating money, thereby reducing the logic of 
targeting broader monetary aggregates” (Vrolijk 1997).   
 
Hedging and Speculation: 
 Derivatives can be useful in hedging against risk but can also be used to take on 
speculative risk. Derivative holdings are largely concentrated at banks. If banks are taking on 
similar derivative bets then the banking system becomes vulnerable (Gorton and Rosen 1995). 
Similarly, in terms of hedging, if everyone is diversified it may not be safe to say that risk is 
actually being effectively hedged because everyone would be holding similar positions. Interest 
rate swaps are particularly sensitive to movements in the interest rate and difficult to determine 
the risk associated with them. Therefore, other types of positions are entered into in order to 
hedge against this risk in swap value. Essentially, “until institutions are required to report the 
interest-rate sensitivity of their swap portfolios, swaps are an easy way to quickly and 
inexpensively alter the risk of a portfolio” (Gorton and Rosen 1995). Derivatives also result in 
information problems. Essentially, when financial organizations suffer losses due to speculation 
in derivative markets there stakeholders do so too. Thus, “a realized loss by one organization 
may be viewed as information about the portfolio position of other organizations” (Gorton and 
Rosen 1995). In dealing with solely banks, those who use derivatives generate a few problems. 
First, outside stakeholders may not be able to accurately determine the overall riskiness of the 
bank and secondly, there is systemic risk if all large banks are taking similar positions in 
derivatives so the failure of one bank may cause many to fail (Gorton and Rosen 1995).  
 What we see is that, due to the fact that banks are too big to fail, they speculate and hold 
un-hedged derivative positions. Therefore, it is important that banks are hedged against their 
interest rate sensitive derivatives because the risk exposure is highly concentrated at large banks 
(Gorton and Rosen 1995). Regulation such as the Too Big To Fail doctrine encourages 
speculation with these innovative instruments and generates a dangerous situation. Banks face 
substantial interests rate risk and the question that should be asked is, who is holding the risk 
from these derivative positions dealing with interest rate sensitive instruments? Essentially, 
“interest rate risk is non diversifiable, so if banks are hedging, then the risk which was 
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transferred to banks by customers is somehow being repackaged and possibly sold back to the 
same customers” (Gorton and Rosen 1995). In reality, in order to regulate the speculative nature 
of banks in dealing with derivatives, there needs to be more information as to what they are 
holding, specifically, with their derivative positions. This should require that banks calculate 
and estimate their exposure to interest rate movements more accurately. Further, the information 
that is needed to better assess banks and their holdings is not reported. Therefore, investors and 
society have to rely on regulators and examiners who have access to the information of the 
banks derivative positions. Also, “there is no inherent asymmetric information between banks 
and others about the risk of swap positions (except for concerns about credit quality)” (Gorton 
and Rosen 1995). Making this information public to investors would allow them to better asses 
the risk associated with the banks. Further, it is important that regulators monitor banks 
derivative positions because they can be used as vehicles for adding on more risk as the 
derivatives stop becoming profitable (Gorton and Rosen 1995). This was similar to the case of 
the JPMorgan London Whale Scandal.  
 Kregel mentions the difficulties and potential problems in using innovative techniques 
such as derivatives and swaps. First, there are many hedge funds and few pension funds that 
specialize in credit default swaps and other credit derivative instruments that are secretive and 
unregulated (Chilcote 2006). Therefore, these financial institutions do not accurately disclose 
their true risk to counterparties and they face risks that they are completely unaware about. 
Ironically, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argues “the development of credit 
derivatives has contributed to stability of the banking system by allowing banks, especially the 
largest, systemically important banks to measure and manage credit risk more effectively” 
(Greenspan 2005). Kregel notes a few issues that may arise from credit derivatives such as the 
potential for all hedge funds to fail simultaneously resulting in banks rushing to buy contracts to 
cover their exposures (Chilcote 2006). Further, a corporation who declares bankruptcy could 
have a substantial impact on the financial system. Essentially, in this scenario, the market could 
become illiquid, if there is a run on the assets of the troubled institutions holding contracts of the 
insolvent corporation (Chilcote 2006). 
 
The JPMorgan London Whale Scandal: 
 A critical point in the JPMorgan London Whale scandal was the banks irresponsible use 
of the credit default swaps. As mentioned before, a credit derivative simply transfers risk 
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between parties. A credit default swap, “insure[s] pools of corporate bonds against credit losses” 
(Chilcote 2006). This contract is similar to a credit insurance policy where “the protection seller 
agrees to pay the protection buyer if some credit event, such as a default,” takes place (Chilcote 
2006). If default occurs, the party who agreed to bear the credit risk is required to pay the 
protection seller. Essentially, “the owner of the credit default obligation absorbs the loss” 
(Chilcote 2006). Further, as the risk of default is heightened this means that there will need to be 
a higher price paid for protection. Additionally, credit default swaps introduce counterparty risk. 
Further, the risk of a counterparty defaulting on their obligations increases systemic risk because 
if some counterparty fails there is a high chance that those around it will also fail (Chilcote 
2006). This is similar to the idea of financial interconnectedness that we saw in discussing 
Minsky where all financial institutions are closely linked to their counterparties and other 
financial players. 
 With the JPMorgan London Whale example, I am essentially looking at the way in 
which too big to fail banks attempt to run a balance sheet hedge against systemic risk. Further, 
this event exhibits how banks respond to capital asset requirements through the use of 
innovative techniques. The London Whale Scandal at JPMorgan Chase was a trading strategy 
that started in early 2008 and collapsed in 2012. JPMorgan Chase had racked up $6 billion in 
trading losses on a specialized derivative portfolio designed to hedge risk. During the time of 
the trading scandal, JPMorgan’s management team had broken many laws that were put in place 
to limit speculative trading by publicly insured banks. The trade was a position in derivatives 
initially authorized by senior management and was a partial response to the Third Basel Accord 
(Basel III) (Le Guyader 2015). This impacted the calculations that determined how much capital 
banks needed to hold measured against their risk-weighted assets. JPMorgan Chase was 
required to either increase the amount of capital it held or reduce its risk-weighted assets. They 
set out to reduce risk. The contracts for the trade were designed to generate gains as credit 
deteriorated in selected markets so it would appear that JPMorgan's balance sheet was being 
hedged (Le Guyader 2015). Essentially, what happened was the nature of the trade had switched 
form a hedge of balance sheet credit risk to a profit generating transaction once profits started to 
generate. The trades were executed without any oversight or trade limit on maximum gains or 
losses, so as the losses piled up they decided to take on even larger positions to cover their 
losses thinking the markets would rebound (Le Guyader 2015). When the losses continued, a 
liquidity problem emerged. The market was willing to sell more of what JPMorgan Chase 
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already held but was much less willing to buy back the product. Ultimately, the trading scandal 
resulted in a ponzi scheme and the hedging strategy was ineffective.  
 The contracts JPMorgan had created and issued in the market “resulted in a net short 
position, meaning the hoped-for gain could only be generated from a market downturn” (Le 
Guyader 2015). However, senior management claimed to not know what was going on and 
when they suddenly realized the trouble they were in they called for a liquidation of the entire 
Chief Investment Offices (CIO) position. Effectively, this meant that senior management 
wanted the traders to stop trading and sell out of the accumulated over the counter derivate 
contracts that were added to the balance sheet. Basically, when the markets became illiquid, loss 
avoidance was the main focus. However, “the market couldn’t liquidate such a large amount in a 
single trade or even over a short period of time” (Le Guyader 2015). Counterparties of 
JPMorgan became concerned and requested additional collateral requirements further worsening 
the image of the bank and their valuation process. JPMorgan not only broke down in their 
management of internal controls but also in reporting fair value measurements in their 
accounting methods. One major issue was that the Chief Investment Office had two sets of 
books, which were used to report internal and external reports. The one kept at the trading desk 
allowed the Chief Investment Office team to “track the difference between reported and reliable 
prices” (Le Guyader 2015). 
 This scandal resulted from the actions of JPMorgan and a trader named Bruno Iksil who 
had been making large bets in the derivatives market. There were three main parts to the trading 
strategy of JPMorgan. First, JPMorgan “purchased credit default swaps on high-yield bonds in 
which JPM would make money if high-yield bonds went down” (Rimkus 2012). Second, they 
“wrote substantial amounts of CDX.NA.IG.9, which is a basket of CDS on investment grade 
bonds from 121 different issuers” (Rimkus 2012). The third component was that JPMorgan had 
bought credit default swaps on the investment grade bonds. The first part of the trading strategy 
was designed to act as a hedge but once the economy improved the trades were not in favor of 
Iksil’s position. Therefore, part two was created in order to hedge against the effects of part one. 
Essentially, “writing CDS on investment grade bonds is intended to take advantage of the 
improving economy that Iksil thought he recognized” (Rimkus 2012). However, the markets 
had gone against his strategy for part two and he decided to try and make up for his losses by 
implementing part three rather than unwinding his position in part two. Iksil faced a substantial 
amount of basis risk and liquidity risk. The trade he made in part two, writing CDX.NA.IG.9 
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index contracts, “was so large that his trading activity created a material gap between the price 
of the index and the sum of the prices of the underlying CDS” (Rimkus 2012). Hedge funds 
were the ones taking the opposite sides of his trades and were angered by the adverse 
movements created by the London Whale, who they referred to as Iksil. Essentially, what 
happened was the nature of the trade had switched form a hedge of credit risk to a profit 
generating transaction.  
 
Hedging Failure: 
 JPMorgan failed in hedging their overall credit exposure and claimed that the trading 
strategy was a poor judgment call. JPMorgan initially sought to design a hedge that would 
“protect the bank from an anticipated decline in the value of its corporate bond holdings, or in 
any of its other global portfolio hedging activities” (Kregel 2012). Kregel noted a few major 
problems that caused the failure of this macro hedge. First, “the banks top managers were 
unable to monitor and assess the inherent risks in an activity of a unit that responded directly to 
them” (Kregel 2012). Ultimately, this was a result of the banks size. The bank was too large and 
complex to monitor and regulate effectively. Kregel mentioned how the bank attracted deposits 
due to its too big to fail nature and the fact that the bank survived the Global Financial Crisis 
because of its size and protection by the government. JPMorgan Chase had a mandate for their 
Chief Investment Office, which states that the bank was tasked to invest the excess reserves “in 
such a way as to hedge its exposure to portfolio holdings of high-risk corporate debt” (Kregel 
2012). These deposits were apparently in excess of the required reserve requirements and 
instead of investing them in safe assets, like government securities, they decided to construct a 
complicated hedging strategy. Essentially, they extended their exposure to risky corporate debt 
and collateralized debt obligations suggesting that they were using the banks own funds on top 
of the excess deposits to create hedge positions (Kregel 2012). Banks that are considered too big 
to fail are profit seekers and they look to maximize the reward for themselves and shareholders. 
Therefore, JPMorgan could not resist the attempt to “earn income from selling credit insurance 
on the same kinds of assets whose losses it was attempting to limit” (Kregel 2012).  
 Kregel believes that going back to the Glass-Steagall act would restrict the banks size so 
that regulation would be effective and the management of the banks would have a better idea as 
to what their activities and risk exposures truly are (Kregel 2012). However, not only do banks 
have to be smaller but also, they have to be monitored as to what activities they are engaging in. 
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Bankers should be concerned with generating growth in the economy not solely its shareholders 
and owners. Minsky believed that Glass-Steagall helped direct investment towards productive 
activities that would help generate future income and employment (Kregel 2012). When banks 
are faced with earning a profit based off the change in prices from assets held in their portfolios, 
it does not help generate economic growth or employment (Kregel 2012). Therefore, banks are 
making bets on their assets rather than investing in growth generating and employment creating 
ventures. Further, Kregel mentions that, the banks that are too big to fail are engaged in the 
wrong risks and types of investments, ones that do not provide capital development for the 
economy (Kregel 2012). 
 Kregel states that the nature of hedging is not a bad development. However, it should not 
be profitable. In an article by Dmitri B. Papadimitriou labeled Another London Whale Shocker, 
he refers to Kregel’s argument that “a true hedging unit only generates profits when a bank’s 
bets on its primary investments are unexpectedly wrong” (Papadimitriou 2013). Therefore, 
hedging is not the issue at stake. It is only an issue when it is becoming consistently profitable. 
This is so because a well ran hedge means that the predications made by the investment 
institution are accurate when the hedge is not profitable. A hedge helps the investor reduce his 
or her fear of uncertainty and losing a potential return. Thus, when the investor is performing 
well, the hedge will run losses indicating that the investor’s predictions were accurate. In much 
of Kregel’s work he stresses the issue with insured banks, there is a risk when they engage in 
proprietary trading and the banks are too big to regulate.  
 As the regulatory landscaped changed after the Global Financial Crisis JPMorgan’s 
Chief Investment Office was not able to come up with a clear mandate and achieve its prior 
goals that were developed in the era of lessened regulation. Therefore, they were unable to 
“create profits from short credit hedges, adjust to improving credit conditions by reducing short 
hedges, and reduce the gross positions of the portfolio to reduce risk weighted capital charges of 
the CIO” (Kregel 2013a). In order to solve this issue of not being able to reach their goals they 
decide to expand “its notional portfolio of long and short CDS index positions” (Kregel 2013a). 
Essentially, this created a ponzi-financing scheme because the position grew too large. Then, the 
losses soon piled up and the unit collapsed. Kregel contends that the Chief Investment Office 
collapsed not only because it was involved in a ponzi financing strategy or proprietary trading, 
but also, because the bank was to large and intertwined with other aspects of banking to run an 
adequate macro hedge. A major issue that Kregel points out in the Chief Investment Offices 
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mandate is the fact that the hedging unit “was remunerated on the basis of profitability” (Kregel 
2013b). Overall, the bank undertook shadow-banking function, which generated a ponzi-
financing scheme. The CEO Jamie Dimon claims that the massive debacle was due to the 
incompetence of the trading unit. However, the size and complexity of the organization created 
evidence that the institution was too big to manage and too big to regulate (Kregel 2013b). The 
Chief Investment Office had a large exposure to credit due to the operations of the bank and 
thus needed to find ways to manage this exposure while complying with Basel II. We have seen 
how regulation, such as, risk weighted capital ratios encourage banks to innovate in order to stay 
competitive taking on even more risky positions. Further, in order to hedge the risks associated 
with these risky investments complex hedging strategies were introduced. However, 
deregulation on the other hand has led to the issue of banks becoming too large to manage 
effectively and regulate. Additionally, this “allows banks to grow to a size that is much too large 
for this type of granular monitoring of the credit risk of a bank’s borrowers” (Kregel 2013b). 
 What we have learned from the JPMorgan London Whale scandal is that large banks 
considered to be too big to fail cannot effectively run a macro hedge nor would they want to try 
and run a micro hedge. Essentially, a micro hedge is used to hedge individual potions, which 
would not be profitable for a large bank. It is more suitable for them to try and hedge their 
overall exposure because large banks would not be able to find instruments necessary to hedge 
each individual position and the basis risk for each position is much smaller and would generate 
a more costly approach to hedging (Kregel 2013b). A macro hedge can be implemented if “you 
expect the economy to underperform, you also expect a policy response of monetary easing, 
leading to lower interest rates. Therefore, a long position in government bonds provides a hedge 
against possible worsening in the conditions of corporate borrowers” (Kregel 2013b). This is a 
typical instrument to hedge with. However, in a macro environment characterized by low 
interest rates and quantitative easing, the use of government securities was not sufficient for the 
Chief Investment Office to hedge against a credit stress event. This is where financial 
innovation and the complex instruments are introduced to generate periods of instability, like we 
have seen in much of Minsky’s work. Essentially, what happened in the JPMorgan London 
Whale Scandal, was that management noticed this phenomenon and, therefore, decided that the 
branch should move “into more complex products to hedge the expanding, ever-more-complex 
holdings of the bank” (Kregel 2013b). Essentially, the bank would only be earning 25 basis 
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points if they were to hedge using government securities, which would not be sufficient to cover 
their costs.  
 Traditionally, when a bank has excess reserves they hold them in what is called 
secondary reserves, which is characterized by “liquid, low-risk Treasury investments that would 
provide liquidity and flexibility to the bank as economics and business conditions changed” 
(Kregel 2013b). However, in order to take on excess reserves this means that the bank would 
have acquired more liabilities through the increase in loans. In a state of deleveraging this was 
highly unlikely and therefore, the bank was using its clients deposits to invest in derivatives 
such as credit default swaps and credit loan obligations. The main problem with the trading 
strategy of the Chief Investment Office was that “the more income it generated from the long 
positions, the higher the probability of having to pay off on a default” (Kregel 2013b). This was 
so, because traders were providing credit protection on the same assets. In the end, the hedge 
designed to profit from credit weakness “turned into a system to generate income to put on a 
hedge and, given the increase in the size of the notional long positions, produced only minimal 
impact on [risk weighted averages]” (Kregel 2013b). Once investors realized how large the 
positions had become they decided to take the other sides of the trades and made it impossible 
for JPMorgan to liquidate their positions at a favorable price.  
 Overall, the scandal of JPMorgan attempted to evade regulation and hide the risky nature 
of its synthetic credit portfolio. The bigger issue is the systemic risk associated with these 
institutions that are considered to be too big to fail. Derivatives are not the problem to be 
concerned with here. The way in which they are used is the main issue. The changing nature of 
the banks mandate resulted in an ineffective and problematic way of trying to run a macro hedge 
on the banks entire credit exposure. Principally, “the problems that arose at JPMorgan Chase 
were due to the use of derivatives to create the equivalent of a shadow bank that provided the 
funding of the unit’s short positions” (Kregel 2013b). Also, the profit seeking nature of the 
Chief Investment Office lead them to believe that they could profit while running a macro hedge 
at the same time. However, this can’t be done because “hedging can only be undertaken at a cost 
that is either an outright expenditure on positions taken that generate actual losses, or in terms of 
an offset to income on profitable positions being hedged.” The last problem that can be 
uncovered deals with the banks actions to engage in proprietary trading. Under the Volcker rule, 
proprietary trading is prohibited but the public bank decided to engage in this speculative 
activity. Hedging activity is considered to be proprietary trading, thus, “hedging and basis risk 
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will make it impossible to judge when such hedging is adequate to cover perceived risks or is 
excessive and thus concealed speculative trading” (Kregel 2013b). This made the public bank 
act as if it were a shadow bank. Ultimately, pursing profits from speculation in hedging 
activities and using their customer’s deposits to fund their speculative activity. These large 
banks must be supervised and have clear reporting standards as to what they are invested in, 
something that Minsky advocated for. Financial innovation can be beneficial, however, when it 
is used to reduce the effects of the policies imposed by regulators, in search of profits, we end 
up with cases such as the JPMorgan London Whale scandal and thus, our economy becomes 
increasingly fragile. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The profit seeking nature of banks can lead to great instances of instability. As 
innovation occurs and the economy heats up the policy tools put in place by monetary 
authorities start to have a minimal impact on controlling the profit seeking nature of these firms. 
Financial institutions are concerned with the protection of their investments however they need 
to innovate in order to stay competitive. Therefore, the profit motives of banks influence them to 
behave in risky ways and undertake speculative positions. Minsky noted that the financial 
system was complex and prone to instability that was created endogenously within the system 
which macroeconomic policy could not completely control. Through Minsky’s work we can see 
that the financial system and structure of the economy is changing and evolving through 
innovative behavior. The financial innovations discussed by Minsky have destabilizing effects 
on the economy. When innovation occurs, it reduces the impact monetary policy has on the 
economy. Further, when the economy is progressing well, the negative effects of the innovative 
behavior from profit seekers are not taken into consideration. Therefore, the monetary 
authorities will only intervene when it is too late. Essentially, each crisis is different from the 
last and liquidity will be stretched to the point of causing a collapse in a boom (Minsky 1957). 
Any type of constraints imposed on the system will result in innovative behavior and liquidity 
will continue to be stretched until instability is present. The role of the Central Bank “is to act as 
the lender of last resort and therefore, to limit the losses due to the financial crisis which follows 
from the instability induced by the innovations during a boom” (Minsky 1957). Minsky noted 
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that the lender of last resort function is the main function of the monetary authorities, rather than 
to stabilize the economy. However, when financial institutions and banks considered to be too 
big to fail are just simply bailed out in the time of a crisis it does not help prevent the risky 
practices and innovations being utilized and further validate their uses. The Central Bank must 
act strongly if it is going to effectively conduct monetary policy. It is important that the 
management and supervisors of these financial institutions are aware of the risks that they bear. 
Therefore, the too big to fail approach must be abandoned and the size of the large banks should 
be reduced to ensure that a failure by one institution will not bring down the whole system. With 
innovation, regulation must adapt constantly. Further, financial innovation has added to the 
degree and complexity of position-making instruments. It is essential that there is a degree of 
oversight in dealing with financial innovation and an awareness of the harm these practices and 
new financial products can cause. In a rising rates environment, innovation will generate 
counteracting forces to policy interventions. Ultimately, innovation is a result of the profit 
seeking nature of the capitalist, which transitioned the economic system to one where “financial 
crisis was unlikely into one that was vulnerable to crises” (Minsky 1986a).  
 When innovation occurs in the view of the profit seeking nature of these firms the ability 
to manage risk becomes more complicated and intense. Firms must protect their balance sheets 
from risk but as the system becomes more complex it becomes more difficult to price risks and 
allocate the necessary resources to ensure that the balance sheet is being properly hedged. This 
leads to inefficiencies in the market and can lead to great build ups of stress in the system and 
ultimately lead to market inefficiencies, like we saw in the Global Financial Crisis and the 
JPMorgan London Whale Scandal, essentially through the build up of leverage and high 
accumulation of complex assets. When risk models are mispricing the actual risks of a financial 
institution it is easy to say that their exposures are sufficiently hedged, when in reality, they are 
poorly estimated. With the JPMorgan London Whale Scandal complex hedging techniques with 
innovative instruments caused the financial system to transform into a state of fragility due to 
the profit seeking nature of these banks that are considered to be too big to fail. Essentially, 
what happened was the profit seeking nature of the Chief Investment Office lead them to believe 
that they could profit while running a macro hedge at the same time. The Chief Investment 
Office collapsed not only because it was involved in a ponzi financing strategy or proprietary 
trading, but also, because the bank was to large and intertwined with other aspects of banking to 
run an adequate macro hedge. Ultimately, this was a result of the banks size. The bank was too 
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large and complex to monitor and regulate effectively. Overall, the scandal of JPMorgan 
attempted to evade regulation and hide the risky nature of its synthetic credit portfolio. The 
bigger issue is the systemic risk associated with these institutions that are considered to be too 
big to fail. Derivatives are not the problem to be concerned with here. The way in which they 
are used is the main issue. However, the complexity of the system and high degree of leverage 
makes the chance of error or mistake more common and, thus, magnifies crises that emerge. 
Ultimately, financial innovation and too big to fail banks impede the influence of monetary 
policy. 
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